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The Endurance of Biological Connection: 
Heteronormativity, Same-Sex Parenting and the Lessons 
of Adoption  
 
Annette R. Appell

 
 
I.  INTRODUCTION  
 
United States family law is largely based on the modern family in 
that the foundation of family law is the patriarchal, heterosexual nuclear 
family, and biology and marriage define family relationships and 
regulate rights, privileges, and benefits among family members and 
against the state. However, the lived relations that constitute postmodern 
families are much more expansive, increasingly fluid, and include adult-
adult and adult-child relationships that do not have the sanction of 
marriage or biological connection. Lesbian and gay families are prime, 
but not the only, examples of these postmodern families.
1
 As a reflection 
of this disconnect between law and society, family law has entered a 
postmodern phase in which society is seeking to accommodate these 
complex and unstable family constellations both by changing law to 
govern family formation and dissolution and by protecting extralegal 
relationships that are formed intentionally and consensually.
2
 Thus, 
postmodern family law is changing to reflect social, and not merely 
biological and marital, relationships. These postmodern families are 
pushing us away from biological connectivity, a movement which is not 
entirely unproblematic,
3
 but provides significant benefits. 
 
 Professor of Law & Associate Dean for Clinical Affairs, Washington University Law School. A big 
thank you to my colleague Joan Howarth for helpful comments on an earlier draft, to my research 
assistants Kim Horner and Kristina Escamilla, and to Lynn Wardle and the Brigham Young 
University Law School for sponsoring and organizing this provocative symposium. 
 1. Postmodern families include a variety of family formations that are not nuclear and 
patriarchal; in other words, they include families headed by single or divorced parents, families with 
working mothers, and stepparent families. See JUDITH STACEY, IN THE NAME OF THE FAMILY 6–7 
(1996) (noting the wide array of families that are not headed by a wife who stays home to rear the 
children and a husband who works outside the home to support the family). 
 2. These changes include de facto parent protections and domestic partnership and civil 
union laws that provide some quasi-marital benefits to unmarried partners. See Annette R. Appell, 
Virtual Mothers and the Meaning of Parenthood, 34 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 683, 720–37 (2001). 
 3. See discussion infra at Sec. II.B–C, III (describing the failed attempt to disregard 
biological connection and assessing the complications of accommodating biology in families in 
which the child has only one biologically related parent). 
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This article considers the role of absent biological parents in lesbian 
and gay families and the lessons adoption law and practice provide for 
these families. Instead of taking a position on the method or propriety of 
these changing family formations, this article explores how children in 
lesbian and gay families might experience their absent birth relations and 
how these families can, and often do, respond to their children‘s longing 
for their biological kin. This exploration reflects conventional adoption 
norms which, like many lesbian and gay families, both mimic and 
disregard biological family formation and embrace unitary or binary 
exclusive parenting while pretending the absent biological parent does 
not exist. These norms, however, have not fully withstood the test of 
time. 
The American experience with adoption law, which was 
institutionalized during the rise of the modern family, illustrates that 
biology cannot be ignored. Adopted children and adults, as well as 
people born through donor-insemination, have challenged this disconnect 
and have pushed adoption practice and law to better accommodate the 
tensions between parental autonomy and the persistent push and pull of 
biological connection.
4
 These tensions and accommodations contain a 
number of lessons for families that are not fully biologically defined or 
contained, such as families headed by single or coupled lesbians and gay 
men. The most important lessons adoption can share are the failures 
attendant to the pretense of rebirth and anonymity and the apparent 
successes of blending birth and adoptive kin to create new family 
systems. The legal regulation of post adoption contact among family 
members, also known as ―cooperative adoption‖ or ―adoption with 
contact,‖ provides another set of lessons. 
This article traces the intersecting and diverging paths of the legal 
norms regarding adoption and legal recognition of same sex parents. It 
compares how adoption law, which for much of its relatively short life 
tried to replicate the modern family by ignoring biology, is now 
embracing biology and how lesbian and gay family law is replicating the 
postmodern family form while moving away from its biological roots. 
Lesbian and gay families, many of them adoptive, appear, however, to be 
heeding lessons about the endurance of biology and acknowledging and 
even embracing their children‘s biological families. Section II reveals the 
tenacity of biological connection and its deep and wide significance in 
United States culture, history, and law. To illustrate this tenacity, the 
section rehearses the failed attempt to close adoption and the resulting 
 
 4. Birth and adoptive parents too have been part of these movements. See infra text 
accompanying notes 34–42. 
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corrective actions. Section III explores lesbian and gay families with 
children, noting ways these families reflect heteronormativity through 
two, rather than plural, parent families and yet still value and honor 
biological connections by including reproductive partners, such as sperm 
donors and surrogates, into their family systems. These largely 
unregulated family systems suggest that same-sex parents are cognizant 
of the important role of biological connections and of the benefits that 
can come from enlarging the circle of adults connected to the child. The 
article concludes, in Section IV, with lessons open-adoption law and 
practice might offer lesbian and gay families with children, particularly 
regarding the possible benefits of developing legal schemes regarding 
these family systems. 
 
II.  BIOLOGICAL PRIVILEGE AND VALUE  
 
This article is part of a larger project that aims to anchor postmodern 
family law in the physical, social, and economic conditions that affect 
the most disaffected among us: those who are socially, economically, and 
politically disadvantaged and those who have experienced the legal loss 
of a biological parent or child. In this context, biological privilege is not 
necessarily a symbol and tool of oppressive patriarchal power and 
traditional family values, but instead offers the only wealth and power to 
which people have relatively equal access regardless of their gender, 
class, or race.
5
 The biological connection and the value family law still 
places on those connections benefit the most vulnerable families.
6
 
Moreover, biology remains important for a host of affective, 
psychological, and existential reasons. 
 
A.  The Existential Value of Biological Ties 
 
The social and legal privilege of biology serves deep and wide 
political and moral purposes, as critical parental rights proponents have 
explored elsewhere,
7
 and also meets social and psychological needs. This 
is not to say that biology and biological connections are not constructed 
or are inherently important, somehow true, or otherwise absolute. It is to 
 
 5. Appell, supra note 2. 
 6. This is because parental status is based primarily on biological connections, including the 
relationship to a biological parent (e.g., through marriage), and such status cannot be revoked except 
on the grounds of parental neglect or abuse. Parental rights belong to parents regardless of race, 
socioeconomic status, age, sexual orientation or identity. Id. at 758–79. 
 7. See PEGGY COOPER DAVIS, NEGLECTED STORIES THE CONSTITUTION AND FAMILY 
VALUES (1997); Appell, supra note 2; Dorothy Roberts, Child Welfare and Civil Rights, 2003 U. 
ILL. L. REV. 171 (2003). 
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say that in our cultural, medical, and legal context, biological ties and 
genetic make-up—for better and for worse—matter. Genes, genetic 
background, and family history increasingly inform medical science.
8
 In 
addition, people are fascinated by their genetic background and what it 
reveals about where they came from and who their ancestors were.
9
 Even 
the construction of race is based on a set of social norms or 
understandings relating to blood lines, national heritage, and often skin 
pigment.
10
 For these and perhaps other reasons, biological connection 
and family history are extraordinarily important to the formation of 
identity. Accordingly, the disruption of these connections is not without 
consequence.
11
 
Identity is a complex, oppositional, non-linear construct that operates 
on psychological, political, personal, and social levels and takes shape by 
contemplating difference and sameness.
12
For example, as a 
psychological matter, identity is part of human cognitive and emotional 
development through which a person begins to understand him- or 
herself as separate from but related to others: as a person who has a past, 
present, and future—a person with race, ethnicity, sex, gender, likes, 
dislikes, and personal experiences, and other aspects of one‘s sense of 
self.
13
  As a social matter, identity relates to one‘s membership in a social 
group, such as doctor, lawyer, woman, white.
14
 Similarly, political 
identity includes claims arising out of membership in a group, and claims 
for benefits arising out of difference and belonging.
15
 The navigation of 
 
 8. James Lindemann Nelson, Genetic Narratives: Biology, Stories, and the Definition of the 
Family, 2 HEALTH MATRIX 71 (1992). 
 9. Dorothy E. Roberts, The Genetic Tie, 62 U. CHI. L. REV. 209, 219–20 (1995) [hereinafter 
Roberts, The Genetic Tie]. But see id. at 231–38 (highlighting the relative lack of interest African 
Americans have in genetic ties when compared to cultural and political identity). Of course, race is 
not biological, but socially constructed. See Dorothy E. Roberts, Legal Constraints on the Use of 
Race in Biomedical Research: Toward a Social Justice Framework, 34 J. L. MED. & ETHICS 526, 
526 (2006) (―Social scientists‘ conclusion that race is socially constructed was confirmed by 
genomic studies of human variation, including the Human Genome Project, showing high levels of 
genetic similarity within the human species.‖). 
 10. Roberts, The Genetic Tie, supra note 9, at 223–30. 
 11. As explored infra Sec. II.C, these consequences relate to the adoptee‘s identity formation, 
the pervasive cultural value of biological connection, and the futility of seeking to erase or ignore 
these connections. 
 12. See Barry Richards, What is Identity?, in IN THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE CHILD, 
CULTURE, IDENTITY AND TRANSRACIAL ADOPTION 77 (Ivor Gaber & Jane Aldridge, eds., 1994). 
 13. Id. 
 14. Id. at 81–84; see also Eric J. Mitnick, Law, Cognition, and Identity, 67 LA. L. REV. 823, 
845–47, 857–69 (2007) (discussing social and personal identity in similar terms as Richards, though 
more extensively, and characterizing personal identity also with individual traits, such as being 
charming). 
 15. E.g., civil rights arising out of the Reconstruction Amendments and Civil Rights Acts; 
see also Convention on the Rights of the Child, G.A. Res. 44/25, U.N. Doc. A/RES/44/25 (Nov. 20, 
1989) (protecting identity); see also Roberts, The Genetic Tie, supra note 9, at 232–33 (noting the 
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these various aspects of external projections and belonging and of 
personal experiences, relationships, and constitution give us a sense of 
identity—how we are like and unlike others, what makes us distinct, and 
what makes us belong. 
Law and culture construct biology and biological connections as 
meaningful and hence meaningful for purposes of identity. In this 
country, racial categories have been defined socially and legally around 
country of origin,
16
 the status or ―race‖ of parents,17 and skin color.18 
These categories and control of their parameters and content are sites of 
political, legal, and social struggles.
19
 Not surprisingly, persons with the 
most privilege control these sites and determine the value of family 
connections and the flow of children, which normally runs from the 
disadvantaged to the advantaged.
20
 This separation reflects a sort of 
market perspective, an idea that certain human beings are untethered, 
moveable, and blank enough to be remade into another image. But from 
the perspective of these transferable human beings, biological ties, race, 
culture, and history are an important part of their identity.
21
 
 
political content of Black identity). 
 16. LINDA GORDON, THE GREAT ARIZONA ORPHAN ABDUCTION 76–77, 105 (1999); 
Roberts, The Genetic Tie, supra note 9, at 223–30. 
 17. E.g., children born to enslaved women were the property of the slave-owner. PATRICIA J. 
WILLIAMS, THE ALCHEMY OF RACE AND RIGHTS 18 (1991); Roberts, The Genetic Tie, supra note 9, 
at 226, 250. Children born into a family with a Black ancestor were considered Black regardless of 
the race of other ancestors. Id. at 228–30. Children born to a Native American parent are likely to be 
considered Native American. Indian Child Welfare Act, 25 U.S.C. § 1903(4) (2000); Annette R. 
Appell, Uneasy Tensions Between Children’s Rights and Civil Rights, 5 NEV. L.J. 141, 162 (2004) 
(discussing Indian family exception doctrine); see also Carlos A. Ball, The Blurring of the Lines: 
Children and Bans on Interracial Unions and Same-Sex Marriages, 76 FORDHAM L. REV. 4 (2008) 
(rehearsing the connection among anti-miscegenation laws, white supremacy and discouraging white 
women from bearing biracial children). 
 18. Roberts, The Genetic Tie, supra note 9, at 225–38. 
 19. Annette R. Appell, “Bad” Mothers and Spanish-Speaking Caregivers, 7 NEV. L. J. 759, 
759–65 (2007). 
 20. See, e.g., GORDON, supra note 16 (rehearsing the child savers‘ treatment of children of 
immigrants and the use of orphan trains generally, and more specifically, the prohibition of Mexican 
American families from adopting European ―orphans‖); Annette R. Appell, Disposable Mothers, 
Deployable Children, 9 MICH. J. RACE & L. 421, 440–64 (2004) (discussing connections between 
welfare and children welfare reform and the one-way transfer transracial adoption from poor African 
American families to white families); Joan C. Callahan & Dorothy Roberts, A Feminist Social 
Justice approach to Reproduction-Assisting Technologies: A Case Study on the Limits of Liberal 
Theory, 84 KY. L.J. 1197, 1217–18 (1996) (noting tendency of courts to uphold powerful, rich men‘s 
rights over birth mothers in surrogacy contracts and how poor people‘s reproductive freedom is often 
compromised); Judith Stacey, Gay Parenthood and the Decline of Paternity as We Knew It, 9 
SEXUALITIES 27, 39 (2006) (―Independent adoption agencies enable middle-class gay men, again 
primarily but not exclusively white and coupled, to adopt healthy infants of a variety of hues.‖); see 
also Callahan & Roberts, supra, at 1199 (noting that non-Hispanic white women are by far the 
primary consumers of reproductive technology). 
 21. See, e.g., SANDRA PATTON, BIRTHMARKS: TRANSRACIAL ADOPTION IN CONTEMPORARY 
AMERICA 2 (2000) (observing that ―transracial adoptees . . . struggled with questions of history, 
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Those whose own or whose ancestors‘ biological connections have 
not been valued and who have been separated from their genetic, 
cultural, political, or historic past experience a longing for and interest in 
those connections. For example, African Americans whose ancestors 
were forcibly torn from their families, tribes, villages, communities, and 
cultures and brought to the Americas experienced profound disruptions 
of identity.
22
 Their family names, language, childrearing, food, and other 
customs were breached both through sales that tore children from kin and 
through brutal imposition of a new way of life.
23
 These breaches, the lack 
of names, and the simple lack of family history so many generations ago 
have driven African Americans today to uncover these mysteries and 
find the missing pieces of their identities—whence they came, to what 
group they belong, and what journey preceded the past few generations.
24
 
Native Americans too experienced forced disruptions in their history 
and cultural life in many ways, including the several-century-long policy 
of removing Native American children from their homes and tribes to 
boarding schools and Anglo-American families.
25
 These disruptions led 
to personal, cultural, and political loss. Separated Native American 
children experienced emotional trauma and feelings of disconnection and 
alienation.
26
 Tribal cultures suffered, as there was a dearth of young 
 
origin, and the meaning of adoption as they continually engaged in processes of identity construction 
and maintenance‖); OUTSIDERS WITHIN: WRITING ON TRANSRACIAL ADOPTION (Jane Jeong Trenka, 
Julia Chinyere Oparah & Sun Yung Shin eds., 2006) (collection of reflections of transracial and 
international adoptees regarding their navigation of their birth and adoptive cultures, particularly 
growing up in white, middle class, American families and neighborhoods). 
 22. DAVIS, supra note 7, at 90–91; E. Christi Cunningham, Exit Strategy For The Race 
Paradigm, 50 HOW. L.J. 755, 764 (2007). This is not to suggest that African-Americans did not 
create new and diverse cultures and traditions in the Americas. See, e.g., IRA BERLIN, MANY 
THOUSANDS GONE: THE FIRST TWO CENTURIES OF SLAVERY IN NORTH AMERICA 17–28 (1998) 
(describing rich and complex social relations, practices, hierarchies and communities). 
 23. For discussions of African and African-American children in and after slavery, see, e.g., 
HERBERT G. GUTMAN, THE BLACK FAMILY IN SLAVERY AND FREEDOM, 1750-1925 (1976); WILMA 
KING, STOLEN CHILDHOOD: SLAVE YOUTH IN NINETEENTH-CENTURY AMERICA (1995); STEVEN 
MINTZ, HUCK‘S RAFT: A STORY OF AMERICAN CHILDHOOD (2004); MARIE JENKINS SCHWARTZ, 
BORN IN BONDAGE: GROWING UP ENSLAVED IN THE ANTEBELLUM SOUTH (2000). 
 24. For example, the African American DNA and history project of leading African and 
African American studies expert Henry Louis Gates examines the historical records of the slave 
trade and later census, voting and other records of the ancestors of present day African Americans, 
and uses DNA testing to trace individual DNA back to various regions in Africa and Europe. 
AFRICAN AMERICAN LIVES 2 (Kunhardt Productions, Inkwell Films & Thirteen WNET New York 
2008), available at http://www.pbs.org/wnet/aalives/ (last visited June 11, 2007). 
 25. Appell, supra note 17, at 148–50; H.R. REP. NO. 104–808, at 16 (1974). At least fifty 
thousand Indian children were adopted by non-Indians in the twentieth century. MINTZ, supra note 
23, at 172 n.45. 
 26. William Byler, The Destruction of American Indian Families, in THE DESTRUCTION OF 
AMERICAN INDIAN FAMILIES 1, 7–9 (Steven Unger ed., 1977); Sandra C. Ruffin, Postmodernism, 
Spirit Healing, and the Proposed Amendments to the Indian Child Welfare Act, 30 MCGEORGE L. 
REV. 1221, 1222 (1999). 
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people to carry on tradition.
27
 The result was a political crisis in which 
tribes themselves were losing members.
28
 Here, the diminution of 
biological connection, the vehicle for culture, was felt deeply and widely 
among children and their elders, while well-meaning missionaries 
thought those ties could be ignored when they placed children in settings 
where they would learn the dominant norms of the colonists.
29
 Individual 
children, families, and entire tribes struggled with identity after these 
interventions.
30
 
Though less violent, less inherently hegemonic, and not entirely 
concentrated in non-dominant racial or cultural groups,
31
 adoption itself 
is similar to these group-based fissures because adoption frequently 
involves poor children, often of color, who are transferred to families 
with more power and resources, and because adoption represents a 
complete break from the adoptee‘s past or a part of her past. The 
phenomenon of closed, anonymous adoption overlooked—or perhaps 
underestimated—the depth, breadth, and complexity of identity. Even 
viewed from the narrow psychological perspective of the adoption 
professionals, the pretense that a child has no life before adoption is built 
on an unwitting commodification of the adopted child—the view of a 
human being without ties, without a past, without race, an object that 
simply and seamlessly can be taken from one place and put in another.
32
 
In a culture in which biological relations provide the first principle of the 
parent-child relationship and exceptions to that principle provide for 
alternate parent-child relationships, it is still unimaginable that a child‘s 
birth connections would not be experienced by all members of the triad 
even when those birth connections are legally void. 
It is not surprising then that social scientists, birth parents, adoptive 
parents, and adoptees have discovered that knowledge regarding these 
connections plays an important role in the development of adoptees‘ 
identities.
33
 It is common for adoptees to experience a deep and ongoing 
 
 27. Appell, supra note 17, at 145–48. 
 28. Id. 
 29. Id. at 147–48. 
 30. Id. 
 31. This is not to say that substitute care and adoption were not used to undermine or destroy 
culture. Beside using these tools to ―civilize‖ Native American Children, the child saving, and later 
the Progressive movements removed children from poor Catholic European immigrants (usually 
mothers) to teach them protestant values and ways of living. Appell, supra, note 20. 
 32. See Barbara Yngvesson, Placing the “Gift Child” in Transnational Adoption, 36 LAW & 
SOC‘Y REV. 227, 239 (2002) (explaining that it is the adoptive child‘s preexisting ties to a family, a 
history, a culture, not just their potential for the future that distinguishes prospective adoptees from 
mere commodities). 
 33. DAVID BRODZINSKY ET AL., BEING ADOPTED: THE LIFELONG SEARCH FOR SELF (1992); 
MIRIAM REITZ & KENNETH W. WATSON, ADOPTION AND THE FAMILY SYSTEM (1992); ARTHUR D. 
SOROSKY ET AL., THE ADOPTION TRIANGLE: THE EFFECTS OF THE SEALED RECORD ON ADOPTEES, 
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desire for ―roots, for existential continuity, and for a sense of 
completeness.‖34 This ―genealogical bewilderment‖35 is common among 
adoptees, regardless of the quality of their adoptive family relationships, 
and do not detract from those relationships. This sense of connection and 
wonder are simply part of the adoption experience.
36
 This interest in 
connections is not limited to adoptees; birth parents and adoptive parents 
experience them as well. Birth parents often feel deep and ongoing or 
episodic connection to the children they relinquished.
37
 Adoptive parents 
too experience the gap between their child‘s original family or 
community and the child‘s adopted one and have their own curiosities 
about the child‘s birth family.38 Although adoptees are most likely to 
return to seek information about their birth kin, many adoptive parents 
also seek to bridge these information and experiential gaps through 
contact with the adoptive agency
39
 and contact with the child‘s home 
community or country.
40
 Birth parents as well commonly seek 
information and connection about the children they relinquished or 
otherwise lost legal connection to.
41
 
Indeed, the entire adoption triad—the adoptive parents, child, and 
birth parents—experience each other in fact or in imagination and are 
changed by each other. For example, transracial adoptees both retain and 
lose their race upon adoption in complicated and contingent ways, 
depending on where and with whom they are.
42
 It is not uncommon for 
parents who adopt internationally to try to experience the country 
whence their child came and to introduce the child to his or her home 
language or culture.
43
 Birth parents seek pictures and even ongoing 
 
BIRTH PARENTS, AND ADOPTIVE PARENTS (1978); Fernando Colon, Family Ties and Child 
Placement, 17 FAM. PROCESS 289, 302 (1978); H.J. Sants, Genealogical Bewilderment in Children 
with Substitute Parents, 37 BRIT. J. MED. PSYCHOL. 133 (1964). 
 34. Colon, supra note 33, at 302. 
 35. Sants, supra note 33. 
 36. BRODZINSKY ET AL., supra note 33, at 12–14; REITZ & WATSON, supra note 33. 
 37. SOROSKY ET AL., supra note 33, at 220. 
 38. Mardell Groth et al., An Agency Moves Toward Open Adoption of Infants, 66 CHILD 
WELFARE 247 (1987). 
 39. E. WAYNE CARP, FAMILY MATTERS: SECRECY AND DISCLOSURE IN THE HISTORY OF 
ADOPTION 75–77 (1998); Groth et al., supra note 38. 
 40. Barbara Yngvesson, Going “Home” Adoption, Loss of Bearings, and the Mythology of 
Roots, 21 SOC. TEXT 74 (2003). 
 41. CARP, supra note 39, at 76–79. 
 42. African Americans adopted into white families report being perceived as Black when in 
white communities and white while in Black communities. RUTH G. MCROY & LOUIS A. ZURCHER, 
JR., TRANSRACIAL AND INRACIAL ADOPTEES: THE ADOLESCENT YEARS 13–14 (1983); PATTON, 
supra note 21, at 13–14;  Yngvesson, supra note 32, at 238–40, 248–52 (noting that a transracially, 
internationally adopted Korean adoptee may be Korean when with his or her Swedish parents but 
Swedish when among Koreans). 
 43. See Yngvesson, supra note 40, at 14–23 (describing such practices among Swedish 
  
289] THE ENDURANCE OF BIOLOGICAL CONNECTION 297 
relationships with the adoptive parents or child after adoption.
44
 
Increasingly, birth and adoptive families form extended kin networks in 
which they might vacation together,
45
 attend each other‘s family 
functions,
46
 and babysit for each other.
47
 The experience of adoption, 
however, was not always so open and dynamic. 
 
B.  Adoption’s (Failed) Attempt to Escape Biological Ties  
 
Adoption was, arguably, the first legal diversion from the patriarchal 
family and primogeniture in recent history. Adoption did not exist in 
England until 1926.
48
 Thus, it was not part of the lexicon the United 
States carried over from England and was unknown at common law. The 
first general adoption statutes in the Unites States, enacted in the 1850s, 
established the hallmark of adoption: the termination of one family and 
creation of another, when in the interests of the child.
49
 Before enactment 
of these general adoption statutes, persons who wanted to create a legal 
relationship with a child did so through private legislative acts.
50
 The 
general adoption statutes permitted adopters to petition the courts rather 
than the legislature to establish a parent-child relationship.
51  
This 
 
adoptors of Chilean children). 
 44. See Annette R. Appell, Blending Families through Adoption: Implications for 
Collaborative Adoption Law and Practice, 75 B.U. L. REV. 997, 1018–19 (1995) (describing birth 
parent ongoing interest in relinquished children). 
 45. Deborah H. Siegel, Open Adoption of Infants: Adoptive Parents’ Feelings Seven Years 
Later, 48 SOC. WORK 409, 414 (2003). 
 46. For example, the adoptive family may attend the birth mother‘s wedding. Id. at 415; 
Murray Ryburn, A Study of Post-Adoption Contact in Compulsory Adoptions, 26 BRIT. J. OF SOC. 
WORK 627, 632 (1996). 
 47. Siegel, supra note 45, at 414; CAROLE SMITH & JANETTE LOGAN, AFTER ADOPTION: 
DIRECT CONTACT AND RELATIONSHIPS 121 (2004). Extended birth family members may also be part 
of this extended kin group. Id. at 92; Ryburn, supra note 46; Siegel, supra note 45, at 414. 
 48. E. Wayne Carp, Introduction to ADOPTION IN AMERICA 1, 3 (E. Wayne Carp, ed., 2004). 
Of course, like the United States, in England there were other methods for transfer of custody to 
other persons outside the family, a transfer that could be, in effect, irreversible. See, e.g., Danaya 
Wright, A Crisis of Child Custody: A History of the Birth of Family Law in England, 11 COLUM. J. 
GENDER & L. 175, 183–90 (2002) (describing custody disputes between parents and third parties in 
the 1700s). 
 49. Annette R. Appell, Legal Intersections, 3 ADOPTION Q. 85, 88 (2000); see also Carp, 
supra note 48, at 5–6 (describing this movement and how the early statues permitted adoption by ―fit 
and proper‖ parents). 
 50. Carp, supra note 48, at 4; Appell, supra note 44, at 1004; Stephen B. Presser, The 
Historical Background of the American Law of Adoption, 11 J. FAM. L. 443, 461–60 (1971); see also 
CARP, supra note 39, at 6–7 (discussing private acts and the use of testamentary adoption prior to the 
generalized adoption statutes). Note that Texas and Mississippi were the first states to adopt general 
adoption statutes but they were less robust statutes than Massachusetts and its progeny. Carp, supra 
note 48, at, 5. These earlier statutes merely permitted adopters to make public a private adoption 
arrangement, ―analogous to recording a deed for a piece of land.‖ Id. 
 51. CARP, supra note 39, at 5. 
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disruption of biological connections to create a new set of legal family 
relationships was, arguably, a modern creation; this development became 
conceivable as society was undergoing a shift in political philosophy 
from one based on divine rule to one based on consent.
52
 This turn itself 
was tied to a notion that children were undeveloped and in need of care.
53
 
This shift toward adoption also coincided with the transition from an 
agricultural to an industrial and more urban economy that increasingly 
separated home and work, creating the social conditions for the modern 
nuclear family.
54
 Children without such a family, those born to single 
mothers, other families without the means to care for children, and those 
children themselves working to support the family, became objects of the 
child saving movement.
55
 This movement, which would eventually 
evolve into our present-day child welfare system,
56
 coincided with, if not 
contributed to, the enactment of adoption laws.
57
 It would be some time, 
however, until the child welfare establishment embraced adoption as a 
service for children in need of protection.
58
 
Although adoption law has remained unchanged in its core principle, 
which was to terminate and recreate a legal parent-child relationship, 
adoption became confidential and anonymous over time. It was not until 
early in the twentieth century when adoption court proceedings and 
records became confidential.
59
 Eventually, authorities began to issue new 
 
 52. HOLLY BREWER, BY BIRTH OR CONSENT 17–44 (2005). 
 53. See id. (tracing the changing view of political authority from the seventeenth to 
nineteenth centuries in America from birth right to consent, and the corresponding change in the 
conception of childhood as one of incompetence rather than entitlement dictated by birth). 
 54. STACEY, supra note 1, at 38–40. Indeed, in pre-modern colonial times, family boundaries 
were porous and not dictated by blood, primarily because of the pervasiveness of voluntary and 
involuntary indentured servitude. CARP, supra note 39, at 6. Adoption historian Wayne Carp 
explains that ―colonial American family life was far from the stable, nuclear family so idealized by 
many twentieth-century Americans: a substantial number of colonial American children grew up in 
families other than their own, many with the consent of their parents.‖ Id. 
 55. See DUNCAN LINDSEY, THE WELFARE OF CHILDREN 13–14 (2d ed. 2004); Gordon, supra 
note 16; JOSEPH M. HAWES, THE CHILDREN‘S RIGHTS MOVEMENT: A HISTORY OF ADVOCACY AND 
PROTECTION 17–24 (1991) (each describing this movement). 
 56. Appell, supra note 17, at 158–59. 
 57. Presser, supra note 50, at 488–89; Leo A. Huard, The Law of Adoption: Ancient and 
Modern, 9 VAND. L. REV. 743, 748 (1956). Wayne Carp notes that the early adoption laws were 
developed in response to an ―increase in the number of middle-class farmers who wished to legalize 
the addition‖ to their family of out-placed children the child savers sent out west as farm laborers. 
CARP, supra note 39, at 11. 
 58. CARP, supra note 39, at 15–18 (describing the preference for keeping families together 
and the stigma attached to adoption as being unnatural and ―second-rate‖). 
 59. Id. at 38–39. In the early days of adoption, birth records were not routinely or uniformly 
kept. Id. at 36–39. In fact, it was not until the 1930s that states began to issue new birth certificates 
that reflected the adoption and even then, the original certificates remained unsealed for decades. 
Elizabeth J. Samuels, The Idea of Adoption: An Inquiry into the History of Adult Adoptee Access to 
Birth Records, 53 RUTGERS L. REV. 367, 376 (2001). 
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birth certificates for the adoptee and sealed the original certificates.
60
 
Initially, the point of sealing birth and adoption records from the public 
view was to protect the unwed mother and the ―illegitimate‖ child, but 
the records remained open to the parties to the adoption.
61
 Indeed, as late 
as the mid-1900s adoption professionals expected that adult adoptees 
would seek information about their family origins.
62
 By that time though 
infant adoption had become more common, and even dominant, in 
response to a series of social changes relating to a growth in infertility, 
the availability of infant formula, and changing psychological theories 
that began to view environment as more important than genes in child 
development.
63
 It was not too long after infant adoption became 
normative that courts, public officials and agencies sealed birth and 
adoption records from the parties themselves.
64
 
Before the sealing of adoption records, first from the public and then 
from the parties, social workers assumed that a child during his or her 
childhood would be firmly within the new family, but that adoptees 
might be interested in their origins once they were adults.
65
 Yet even 
during the adoptee‘s minority, social workers would accommodate the 
requests of adoptive parents to find information about birth relatives and 
even viewed the birth mothers as still connected to the child.
66
 For 
example, social workers might reflexively inform a birth parent when the 
child she gave up for adoption was ill or had died.
67
 Implicitly these 
 
 60. CARP, supra note 39, at 52–55. Even after these new birth certificates were issued, there 
was no intention initially and as late as the middle of the twentieth century to keep a child‘s original 
birth certificate or identity from the adoptee. Id. 53–55. On the contrary, adoption professionals 
―anticipated that children born out of wedlock would naturally inquire about their family origins 
when grown and believed that there was something inherently right about preserving an accurate 
account of the past.‖ Id. at 52. See also Samuels, supra note 59, for a thorough legal history of the 
confidentiality of adoption records. 
 61. CARP, supra note 39, at 48–55. 
 62. Id. at 52. While it became standard practice to issue new birth certificates reflecting that 
the adoptee was the child of the adoptive parents ―[t]here [was] no evidence that child welfare or 
pubic health officials ever intended that issuing new birth certificates to adopted children would 
prevent them from gaining access to their original one.‖ Id. at 54–55; see also Samuels, supra note 
59, at 387–92 (describing the differences between child welfare and vital statistics views regarding 
access to birth records). 
 63. Appell, supra note 44, at 1004–05; see also CARP, supra note 39, at 27–29 (noting the 
change in the view of adopted children as genetically inferior and doomed during the 1920s and 
1930s, the drastic increase of out-of-wedlock births and during and after World War II, and the 
ability to diagnose infertility by the 1950s); Appell, supra note 17, at 158–59. 
 64. Samuels, supra note 59, at 406–08. Most states closed their adoption court records by the 
1950s. Id. at 377–78. In 1960 though, adult adoptees in twenty states still had access to their original 
birth certifications. Id. at 378. Birth records remained open to adult adoptees in most of these states 
until 1979. Id. at 382. 
 65. Id. at 374–78. 
 66. CARP, supra note 39, 74–80. 
 67. Id. at 79. 
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social workers understood that the ties between mother and child were 
deep and lasting. Similarly, adoption agencies might provide information 
about an adopted child‘s siblings at the request of the adoptive parents.68 
There appeared to be no doubt that adopted adults should have access to 
identifying and other information about their birth families.
69
 
The real break between birth and adoptive families seems to have 
arisen with the development and popularization of psychoanalytic and 
child development theories after World War II.
70
 Those theories 
pathologized unwed mothers, designating them as ―neurotic‖ women 
who were immature and would neglect their children.
71
 Moreover, 
psychological theories favored nurture over nature, holding that the 
unmarried mother‘s immorality and other perceived defects would not 
genetically transmit to her children.
72
 According to this zeitgeist, it was 
best to separate white non-marital children
73
 from this pathology and 
immorality and place them into a new, normal family.
74
 In addition, child 
development theory suggested that this transfer occur as soon after birth 
as possible.
75
 Thus, the child, unburdened by genetic determinism, could 
be raised without knowledge or the influence of the birth mother‘s 
pathology and be reared instead in the healthy and wholesome, new, 
marital, adoptive family. 
Finally, the post-war emphasis on family and the non-normativity of 
childless couples also militated toward an anonymous adoption 
solution.
76
 Infertile couples could adopt infants and raise them as their 
own. As adoption scholar Elizabeth Samuels asserts, adoption became 
the ―perfect and complete substitute for creating a family through 
childbirth.‖77 Under these new social conditions, the adoption paradigm 
 
 68. Id. at 75 (reporting on a adoptive parents requesting adoption agencies to help them put 
children in touch with their siblings or mothers). This is not to suggest that adoption agencies 
encouraged post-adoption contact, but merely that they may have responded openly and helpfully to 
inquiries from adoptive parents, adopted adults and even birth parents, at least in the early to mid-
1900s. Id. at 71–89. 
 69. Id. at 73–74; Samuels, supra note 59, at 377–78. 
 70. Samuels, supra note 59, at 406–10. 
 71. CARP, supra note 39, at 113–17. 
 72. Samuels, supra note 59, at 406; see also CARP, supra note 39, at 113–17 (tracing the rise 
of psychological theories that held that unwed mothers were neurotic and whose children should be 
removed for their own sake and for the sake of the mother‘s mental health). 
 73. See RICKIE SOLINGER, WAKE UP LITTLE SUZIE: SINGLE PREGNANCY AND RACE BEFORE 
ROE V. WADE (1992) (describing differential legal and social responses to African-American and 
white single mothers and their children). 
 74. CARP, supra note 39, at 115–16; Samuels, supra note 59, at 402–07. 
 75. CARP, supra note 39, at 116. 
 76. Samuels, supra note 59, at 406–08. 
 77. Id. at 406–07; see also, Naomi Cahn, Perfect Substitutes or the Real Things?, 52 DUKE L. 
J. 1077 (2003) (tracing and contextualizing the social and legal history of adoption law). 
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became one of fictive birth that substituted the adoptive parents for the 
birth parents on the birth certificate and eventually sealed the original 
birth certificate even from adoptees of any age.
78
 Under this view, it was 
best for the birth mother to go on with her life and have nothing to do 
with the child; for the child to have no contact with or contamination by 
the birth mother; and for the adoptive parents to act as if the adopted 
child were their own genetic offspring.
79
 
In substance, this unitary approach provided solely for confidential, 
static adoptive relationships that terminated all pre-birth connections and 
sealed all birth records. This rebirth paradigm and its accompanying 
anonymity became the normative model of adoption even for related 
adoptions and adoptions of older children.
80
 The only major changes in 
adoption law until the 1990s related to the inclusion of putative fathers as 
legal parents
81
 and stepparent adoption.
82
 Otherwise, the law of secrecy 
and anonymity persisted, even as older children were adopted from foster 
care and stepparents adopted their stepchildren, many of whom knew 
their birth parents. 
What has remained in most states is adoption‘s heteronormative 
frame that views families as heterosexual, marital, and exclusively two-
parent. Although single people can adopt, two persons may only adopt if 
they are married.
83
 Moreover, adoption terminates the parental rights of 
the biological parents, except in the case of a stepparent adoption in 
which case the custodial parent could retain his or her parental rights 
while her spouse adopted the child.
84
 In the process, the child loses the 
 
 78. Samuels, supra note 59, at 367–437. Still, at least two states never sealed these records 
and several states have since opened them. Id. at 380–81, 431–34. For a current list of open records 
laws, see the American Adoption Congress website, http://www.americanadoptioncongress.org 
/state.php (last visited Mar. 30, 2008). 
 79. See infra. Sec. II.C (describing changes in adoption starting in the 1990s, including same-
sex couple adoption and adoption with contact). 
 80. See Samuels, supra note 59, at 403–08 (describing the social and legal norms that 
portrayed adoptive families as a simple substitute for birth families). 
 81. These changes occurred as a result of the United States Supreme Court holding in Stanley 
v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972), which held that a non-marital father had a right to process before the 
state could remove his children. 
 82. Professor June Carbone marks the beginning of stepparent adoption in 1925 with 
Marshall v. Marshall, 239 P. 36 (Cal. 1925). June Carbone, The Role of Adoption in Winning Public 
Recognition for Adult Partnerships, 35 CAP. U. L. REV. 341, 385 (2006). 
 83. Annette R. Appell, Lesbian & Gay Adoption, 4 ADOPTION Q. 75, 79–80 (2001). This 
marriage requirement probably reflects the normativity of the connection between marriage and 
childrearing rather than any conscious attempt to prohibit two unmarried people from adopting. See, 
e.g., Adoption of Tammy, 619 N.E.2d 315, 319 (Mass. 1993) (finding no legislative intent to 
prohibit non-marital couples from adopting); In re Infant Girl W., 845 N.E.2d 229 (Ind. Ct. App. 
2006) (same). But see, e.g., In re Adoption of Baby Z., 724 A.2d 1035, 1060 (Conn. 1999) (holding 
that the Connecticut legislature intended for only married couples to adopt). 
 84. Appell, supra note 83, at 79. 
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legal connection, including the right to visitation and to one of his or her 
parents. In its attempt to replicate heteronormativity, adoption provided 
that adoptive children could have no more than two parents, as if they 
were born through the union of their adoptive parents. 
 
 C.  Opening Adoption  
 
Changing social norms and family structures in the last half of the 
twentieth century and early part of the
 
twenty-first century have 
challenged this heteronormative model of adoption as families are 
increasingly and legally formed and reformed without mutual biological 
connection, as in the case of stepparent and lesbian and gay adoption. In 
fact, courts and even legislatures are permitting same-sex couples to 
adopt children together.
85
 These changes preserve the core aspects of 
parental status and rights, including the prohibition on more than two 
legal parents, but they cut off almost every legal tie between the adoptee 
and his or her birth family—parents, siblings, aunts, uncles, and 
grandparents.
86
 Yet while law largely retains a heteronormative, nuclear 
family structure, families that are non-heterosexual, reformed, or simply 
non-nuclear are quite common. In addition, the children of these 
families—as children and adults—have pushed against this structure in 
their pursuit of biological family relations, challenging the secrecy and 
myth in adoption.
87
 Thus, despite the tenacity of the nuclear, 
heteronormative family, lesbian and gay parenthood and other economic 
and social changes have diluted heteronormativity and destabilized 
nuclear families such that social family boundaries are more permeable. 
These postmodern families and the porousness of their affective, if 
not legal, family relations are part of a larger set of movements that have 
challenged adoption‘s myth of rebirth and mandate of secrecy. What 
goes around comes around and so it has been with adoption. Where once 
unwed, stigmatized, birth mothers‘ only choice was to relinquish their 
 
 85. E.g., CAL. FAM. CODE § 9000(f) (West 2005); CON. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 45a-724 (West 
2004); D.C. CODE ANN. § 16-312(a) (LexisNexis 2000); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15 § 1204 (2002); 
Sharon S. v. Superior Court, 73 P.3d 554 (Cal. 2003); In re M.M.D., 662 A.2d 837 (D.C. 1995); In 
re K.M., 653 N.E.2d 888 (Ill. App. Ct. 1995); In re Infant Girl W., 845 N.E.2d 229 (Ind. Ct. App. 
2006); In re Adoption of K.S.P., 804 N.E.2d 1253 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004); In re M.M.G.C., 785 N.E.2d 
267 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003); Adoption of Tammy, 619 N.E.2d 315 (Mass. 1993); In re Adoption of 
M.A., 930 A.2d 1088 (Me. 2007); In re Adoption of Two Children by H.N.R., 666 A.2d 535 (N.J. 
Super. Ct. App. Div. 1995); In re Jacob, 660 N.E.2d 397 (N.Y. 1995); In re Adoption of Carolyn B., 
774 N.Y.S.2d 227 (N.Y. App. Div. 2004); In re Adoption of R.B.F., 803 A.2d 1195 (Pa. 2002); In re 
Adoption of B.L.V.B., 628 A.2d 1271 (Vt. 1993); see also Tenn. Atty Gen. (Oct. 10, 2007). Op. No. 
07-140. (opining that if the adoption is ―found to be in the best interest of the child, there is no 
prohibition in Tennessee adoption statutes against adoption by a same sex couple‖). 
 86. See infra Sec. III.B and text accompanying notes 173–184. 
 87. Appell, supra note 44, at 1008–13. 
  
289] THE ENDURANCE OF BIOLOGICAL CONNECTION 303 
babies for adoption and there was a corresponding abundance of infants 
available for adoption, in their stead arose greater reproductive choice 
and acceptance of single, unwed motherhood.
88
  These changes resulted 
in a near dearth of infants but also an abundance of older children in the 
adoption pool.
89
 These older children, primarily step and foster children, 
often knew and even continued to know their birth parents, thus making 
the rebirth theme of adoption less tenable.
90
 Moreover, as a result of 
increased reproductive choice and changing legal and social mores 
regarding the validity of anonymous adoption, there has been a rise of 
openness in adoption.
91
 
In addition, mental health and adoption experts have noted that 
adoptees have great and nearly universal interest in their origins.
92
 
Quantitative and qualitative studies, as well as the theoretical literature, 
have found that the vast majority of adoptees are curious about their birth 
families,
93
 think about them at various rites of social and developmental 
passage,
94
 and have an interest in meeting their birth parents.
95
 Social 
science research points to the importance of knowledge about birth 
connections to the development of adoptees‘ identity. 96  Psychologists 
understand that questions about birth families and birth histories play an 
important and persistent role in an adoptive child‘s development and that 
adoptees have ongoing questions about their adoption.
97
 These questions 
may include why they were adopted, what their birth parents are like and 
what they look like, their national heritage, whom they resemble, and 
what genes they may be passing on to their children.
98
 It is now widely 
 
 88. Psychological and social theories evolved to view single parenthood as less pathological. 
CARP, supra note 39, at 201. This view that single mothers are pathological, however, is still widely 
held, primarily in the context of poor and African American families. Appell, supra note 17. 
 89. CARP, supra note 39, at 201–03; Appell, supra note 44, at 1008–09. 
 90. Appell, supra note 44, at 1014–20. 
 91. See CARP, supra note 39, at 196–201 (tracing the critiques of adoption and the movement 
toward openness). 
 92. E.g., RUTH MCROY ET AL., CHANGING PRACTICES IN ADOPTION 20 (1994). 
 93. E.g., id. (describing a large, longitudinal study which revealed that regardless of whether 
they were in open or closed adoptions, ―[v]irtually all of the children . . . wanted to know more about 
their birth parents.‖); PETER L. BENSON ET AL., GROWING UP ADOPTED 26 (1994) (one of the largest 
studies of adolescent adoptees found that over 80% of adoptees adopted as infants were curious 
about their birth parents). 
 94. BRODZINSKY ET AL., supra note 33. 
 95. BENSON ET AL., supra note 93, at 26 (finding that 70% of adolescent girls and 57% of 
adolescent boys expressed an interest in actually meeting their birth parents). 
 96. See BRODZINSKY ET AL., supra note 33, at 12–14; REITZ & WATSON, supra note 33; 
Sants, supra note 33; Kenneth W. Watson, The Case for Open Adoption, Fall PUB. WELFARE 24 
(1988). 
 97. BRODZINSKY ET AL., supra note 33, at 12–14; REITZ & WATSON, supra note 33; Sants, 
supra note 33. 
 98. BRODZINSKY ET AL., supra note 33. 
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understood among mental health experts that adoptees continue to be 
members of their adoptive and birth families.
99
 
Thus, adoption has entered yet another phase as it seeks to 
accommodate these new perspectives on identity, family, and biological 
connection. Although records continue to be sealed in most states
 
(even 
from adult adoptees)
 100
 and confidentiality continues to envelop court 
proceedings and adoption agency records, adoptive and birth families, on 
their own and increasingly with the assistance of child welfare and 
adoption agencies, are forging new adoption practices and even new 
adoption and biological kin networks. These open relationships run a 
spectrum from the exchange of information between the two sets of 
parents to ongoing exchange of letters and pictures or visits all the way 
to shared vacations. 
Generally, these post-adoption relationships are privately ordered 
and maintained. In other words, open adoption arrangements are 
informal and based on the agreement of those people involved, 
agreements that do not carry the force of legal sanction should any of the 
parties chose to discontinue or otherwise stray from the agreed terms.
101
 
In other cases, these ongoing contact relationships are court-ordered or 
court-sanctioned.
102
 Court-ordered open adoption is an incursion into 
family autonomy and may be problematic in light of research that 
suggests that the adoptive parents‘ comfort with and sense of control 
over post-adoption contact is a significant indicator of success of such 
relationships.
103
Court sanctioned post-adoption contact is arguably 
preferable because it allows the persons involved in the contact to 
determine what is best for them in the first instance, with resort to the 
court as an option should disagreements later arise.
104
 
This latter type of open adoption provides a new form of adoption in 
which the parties agree, as part of the adoption, to be bound by their 
post-adoption contact agreements. In part a response to the prevalence of 
 
 99. See id. at 12–14; REITZ & WATSON, supra note 33; Sants, supra note 33, at 133; Watson, 
supra note 96, at 24. 
 100. MADELYN FREUNDLICH, FOR THE RECORDS: RESTORING A RIGHT TO ADULT ADOPTEES 
10–11 (Nov. 2007), available at http://www.adoptioninstitute.org/publications 
/2007_11_For_Records.pdf (last visited Mar. 8, 2008). 
 101. Annette R. Appell, The Move Toward Legally Sanctioned Cooperative Adoption: Can it 
Survive the Uniform Adoption Act?, 30 FAM. L. Q. 483, 500–01 (1996). 
 102. Annette R. Appell, Enforceable Post Adoption Contact Statutes, Part II: Court-Imposed 
Post Adoption Contact, 4 ADOPTION Q. 101 (2000) [hereinafter Appell, Part II]; Annette R. Appell, 
Enforceable Post-Adoption Contact Statutes, Part I: Adoption with Contact, 4 ADOPTION Q. 82 
(2000) [hereinafter Appell, Part I]. 
 103. HAROLD D. GROTEVANT & RUTH G. MCROY, OPENNESS IN ADOPTION 16 (1998). 
 104. Annette R. Appell, Survey of State Utilization of Adoption with Contact, 6 ADOPTION Q. 
75 (2003). 
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open adoption and concerns regarding fairness issues in the private 
ordering prevalent in open adoption,
105
 this new statutory form of 
adoption reflects the different but deep and pervasive roles of social and 
biological kinship. These statutes do not supplant the private 
arrangements, but instead make clear which arrangements are formal and 
enforceable and which are informal and unenforceable. Those open 
adoption agreements entered into outside these mechanisms continue to 
be unregulated and are most likely more common than the statutory 
agreements. 
This codification, known also as cooperative adoption or adoption 
with contact, represents a model of accommodation of family privacy 
and the existential facts of adoption: that the birth family and adoptive 
family are tied together through the child; and adopted children are 
members of two families. Approximately twenty states have adoption 
with contact statutes.
106
 These statutes allow adoptive parents and birth 
relatives or others at, or before, the time of adoption to enter into 
enforceable agreements for post-adoption contact, such as visitation or 
correspondence.
107
 The statutes do not permit approval or enforcement of 
post-adoption contact plans unless the adoptive parents and the party 
who will have contact agree to such a plan at or before the time of 
adoption.
108
 Nor do they permit the failure of post-adoption contact to 
invalidate the adoption.
109
 They do present a significant incursion into 
the legal and social paradigm of adoption as rebirth. Adoption with 
contact both acknowledges the child‘s pre-adoptive birth ties and brings 
these connections forward into the adoption, often as a part of the 
adoption decree itself. In this way, the statutes in effect create a new type 
of adoption in the sense that from the start, the parties are committed to 
ongoing cooperation around the child. 
 
 105. Id. at 79 (finding that these concerns have led a number of states to codify such 
adoptions). 
 106. Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 8-116.01 (1999); Cal. Fam. Code § 8616.5 (West 2008); Conn. 
Gen. Stat. Ann. § 45a-715(h)–(n) (West 2000); Fla. Stat. Ann. § 63.0427 (2001); Ind. Code Ann. § 
31-19-16-1 to 8 (1994); La. Child. Code. Ann. art. 1269.1–1269.7 (2001); Md. Fam. Code. Ann. §§ 
5-308, 5-3A-08, 5-3B-07 (West 2006); see also Md. Code Ann., Fam. Law §§ 5-331, 5-345 (West 
2006); Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. Ch. 210, §§ 6C, 6D, 6E (West 1999); Minn. Stat. Ann. § 259.58 
(West 1997); Mont. Code Ann. § 42-5-301 (1997); Neb. Rev. Stat. §§ 43-162 to 165 (1993); Nev. 
Rev. Stat. §§127.187, 127.1875, 127.188, 127.1885, 127.189, 127.1895 (2005); N.M. Stat. Ann. § 
32A-5-35 (West 1993); N.Y. Dom. Rel. Law § 112-b (McKinney 2005); N.Y. SOC. SERV. LAW § 
383-c(5)(b)(ii) (McKinney 2005) (as amended in 2005); OR. REV. STAT. § 109.305 (1993); R.I. GEN. 
LAWS § 15-7-14.1 (1997); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 25-6-17 (1997); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15A, § 4-112 
(1995); WASH. REV. CODE § 26.33.295 (1990); W. VA. CODE § 48-22-704(e) (1997). 
 107. Appell, supra note 104 at 76–77. 
 108. Id. at 76. 
 109. Id. at 76–77. 
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Open adoption, particularly as it is regulated through adoption with 
contact, exemplifies preciousness of biological connections and the 
various types of parenting relationships adults can have with children 
that are both non-exclusive but also deeply protective of family privacy 
and autonomy. The open adoptive family preserves the connection 
between parent and child while creating at least one new non-biological 
parent in the child‘s life. Adoption with contact serves both to regulate 
these relationships and make clear whether the non-legal parent has any 
enforceable right to ongoing contact should disagreements regarding the 
contact arise.
110
 As discussed below, such a regime could help clarify the 
rights (or lack of rights) of the biological parents in the satellite of same-
sex couple families.
111
 
These changes in adoption law and practice hold lessons for lesbian 
and gay single parents and same-sex couples who cannot reproduce 
without the reproductive tissue or labor of someone with whom they are 
not intimate. These families and adoptive families are similar in that they 
deviate from the two-biological-parent (in this sense, heterosexual) 
family, even while they reflect that family form; lesbian, gay, and 
adoptive families are frequently created through the non-sexual 
reproduction of children using assisted reproductive technologies (ART) 
and adoption or other legal mechanisms;
112
 and they each contain the 
actual or lurking presence of other relations (e.g., biological mother or 
father, siblings). Nevertheless, families in open-adoption are not trying to 
escape the pull of biology; on the contrary, they are embracing it.
113
 It 
appears that lesbian and gay families too may be embracing biological 
connections.
114
 
 
 III.  SAME-SEX PARENTS: LESBIAN AND GAY FAMILIES AND THE 
MISSING BIOLOGICAL PARENT  
 
Lesbian and gay couples cannot create children together without 
assistance from third (and even fourth) parties. Yet many lesbian and gay 
couples are parenting children.
115
 These parenting relationships may have 
 
 110. Id. at 83–84. 
 111. See infra Sec. IV. 
 112. Fiona Tasker, Lesbian Mothers, Gay Fathers, and Their Children: A Review, 26 DEV. & 
BEHAV. PEDIATRICS 224, 224–25 (2005). 
 113. See infra text accompanying notes 102–116. 
 114. See infra Sec. III.A–B. 
 115. The 2000 census estimated that 27% of same-sex couples have a minor child living in the 
home. GARY J. GATES ET AL., ADOPTION AND FOSTER CARE BY GAY AND LESBIAN PARENTS IN THE 
UNITED STATES (2007), available at http://www.law.ucla.edu/williamsinstitute/publications/ 
FinalAdoptionReport.pdf. The census did not count children in those homes, but estimates place the 
number of children living with lesbian and gay parents anywhere from just under two million to 
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originated in a variety of ways including during previous heterosexual 
relationships, foster care or adoption, and assisted reproduction. 
Moreover, states are beginning to give lesbian and gay couples quasi- or 
actual marital status that entitles these couples to be treated the same as 
married couples under all aspects of family law.
116
 For example, a 
handful of states apply marital presumptions to children born to couples 
in civil unions
117
 and permit lesbians and gays to adopt their partner‘s 
child just as a stepparent would.
118
 Thus, the newly recognized 
homosexual families resemble traditional notions of intimate adult 
relationships as coupled, monogamous, and financially productive and 
intertwined unions. In all of these instances, the children reared by 
lesbian and gay couples have more than two parents. Yet, the law 
recognizes at most two parents.
119
 So far lesbian and gay families 
receiving family status appear to be quite conventional—almost 
heteronormative except that they are same-sex.
120
 Indeed, the 
Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court defined the same-sex 
relationships that are entitled to marital recognition as those couples who 
―are willing to embrace marriage‘s solemn obligations of exclusivity, 
mutual support, and commitment to one another . . . .‖121 
Despite concerns of social conservatives that recognizing lesbian and 
gay couples will undermine heterosexual norms,
122
 the assimilation 
 
fourteen million. William Meezan & Jonathan Rauch, Gay Marriage, Same-Sex Parenting, and 
America’s Children, 15 FUTURE OF CHILD. 97, 98 (2005) (estimating one-hundred sixty-six 
thousand); Tasker, supra note 112, at 224 (estimating two to fourteen million). 
 116. CAL. FAM CODE § 297.5 (West 2001); CONN. GEN. STAT. §§ 46b-38aa-38pp, 2006; New 
Jersey, An Act Concerning Civil Unions, 37 P.L. 2006, Art. 6, 15; VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 23 § 1204 
(2000). Regarding marriage: Goodridge v. Dep‘t of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941 (Mass. 2003). 
 117. E.g., CAL. CIV. CODE § 1714.01 (West 2001) (permitting domestic partners to recover 
like spouses for negligent infliction of emotional distress); New Jersey, An Act Concerning Civil 
Unions, 37 P.L. 2006, Art. 6, ¶ 92 (―Whenever in any law, rule, regulation, judicial or administrative 
proceeding or otherwise, reference is made to ‗marriage,‘ ‗husband,‘ ‗wife,‘ ‗spouse,‘ ‗family,‘ 
‗immediate family,‘ ‗dependent,‘ ‗next of kin,‘ ‗widow,‘ ‗widower,‘ ‗widowed,‘ or another word 
which in a specific context denotes a marital or spousal relationship, the same shall include a civil 
union pursuant to the provisions of this act.‖). 
 118. E.g., CAL. FAM. CODE § 9000(b); New Jersey, An Act Concerning Civil Unions, 37 P.L. 
2006, Art. 6, ¶ 5(d). 
 119. See infra Sec. II. 
 120. Infra text accompanying notes 124–132. Their children appear to have appropriated 
heterosexual norms as well. See Beth Perry et al., Children’s Play Narratives: What They Tell Us 
About Lesbian-Mother Families, 74 AM. J. ORTHOPSYCHIATRY 467, 476 (2004) (noting that children 
in both single heterosexual and lesbian parent families, children chose a male doll to represent the 
second parent. Thus even these lesbian-parented children ―have a clear idea of what constitutes a 
traditional family and of social norms‖ either because they are conforming to social expectations or 
that ―parents are just seen as parents regardless of their sex.‖). 
 121. Goodridge, 798 N.E.2d at 965. 
 122. E.g., Lynn D. Wardle, Parentlessness: Adoption Problems, Paradigms, Policies, and 
Parameters 4 WHITTIER J. CHILD & FAM. ADVOC. 323, 362–68 (2004) (expressing concerns that, 
among other things, same-sex adoption does not reflect traditional heterosexual parenting). 
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reflected in same-sex parent adoption appears to reinforce notions that 
families are nuclear, monogamous, and economically autonomous.
123
 In 
fact, feminist, gay, and other critical theorists identify and question the 
exclusionary and, perhaps, stultifying, aspects of assimilation. By 
embracing dominant liberal norms that naturalize and privatize the 
family, these critics suggest that legal recognition of these traditional 
non-traditional families fails to acknowledge, let alone address, the 
problematic aspects of this model.
124
 These problems include the model‘s 
failure to counter the inequality-producing and inequality-maintaining 
aspects of the economically and legally private family
125
 or to account 
for the variety of family formations and lesbian and gay identities.
126
  
Instead, same-sex adoption appears to reinforce social and legal norms 
regarding adult and family relationships, protecting individual 
relationships while leaving legal, social, and economic structures intact. 
Moreover, even the frameworks for assessing lesbian and gay parented 
families utilize ―heterosexual-parent households as the gold standard and 
implies that differences equal deficits.‖ 127  This measure thus masks 
differences between heterosexual and homosexual parenting and avoids 
assessments that same-sex parent families may provide different and 
positive social and psychological lessons.
128
 
Still, even those lesbian and gay couples who are modeling 
heteronormativity—binary couples, mutual support, relationships toward 
children that reflect adult intimate relationships, and even exclusive 
(legal) parenting—can and do provide examples of more complex and 
less domesticated kinship networks that recognize expansive kin 
networks. Thus, though critics like Katherine Franke accurately lament 
that the lesbian and gay political ―investment in the politics of kinship 
has resulted in the atrophying of an ability to critically and creatively 
think sexuality outside the domestic couple‖,129 it may be that in the 
 
 123. Angela Harris, From Stonewall to the Suburbs, 14 WM. & MARY BILL OF RTS. J. 1539, 
1567–71 (2006). 
 124. E.g., MARTHA FINEMAN, THE AUTONOMY MYTH: A THEORY OF DEPENDENCY (2004); 
NANCY POLIKOFF, BEYOND (STRAIGHT AND GAY) MARRIAGE 138–145 (2008); MICHAEL WARNER, 
THE TROUBLE WITH NORMAL (1999); Harris, supra note 123. 
 125. Harris, supra note 123, at 1567–71. 
 126. MICHAEL WARNER, THE TROUBLE WITH NORMAL 25–52 (1999); Katherine M. Franke, 
The Politics Of Same-Sex Marriage Politics, 15 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 236, 246 (2006) 
[hereinafter Franke, Politics]; Katherine M. Franke, The Domesticated Liberty Of Lawrence v. 
Texas, 104 COLUM. LAW. REV. 1399 (2004). 
 127. Abbie E. Goldberg, (How) Does it Make a Difference? Perspectives of Adults With 
Lesbian, Gay, and Bisexual Parents, 77 AM. J. ORTHOPSYCHIATRY 550, 550 (2007). 
 128. Judith Stacey and T.J. Biblarz, (How) Does the sexual orientation of parents matter?, 65 
AM. SOCIOLOGICAL REV. 159 (2001). 
 129. Franke, Politics, supra note 126, at 247. 
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context of kinship, lesbian and gay families, despite their apparent 
emulation of the private, heterosexual family, are pushing the boundaries 
of kinship to be more inclusive and reflective of larger communities 
around children.
130
 This embrace and enlargement of kinship holds the 
promise of leading to a broader sense of kinship with broader 
communities rather than exclusive nuclear families. 
This is because even when lesbian and gay couples have children, 
they still do not neatly fit into that two parent biologically-based norm. 
The adoption fiction of rebirth is, therefore, more difficult to sustain 
simply by virtue of the sex of the parents. There are other people out 
there who have reciprocal biological if not affective relationships with 
the children. Lesbian adoptions often involve known birth fathers or 
sperm donors and gay male adoptions are likely to be as open as other 
adoptions.
131
 Indeed, unlike many heterosexual families created through 
ART, lesbians and gays may be more likely to make informal 
arrangements with known donors or surrogates to create their families.
132
 
In these cases, the birth parents or donors may be involved with the child 
on an ongoing basis.
133
 Even when the birth relatives are not active 
members of the child‘s life, the adoptive parents, and sometimes the 
adoptee, know who the child‘s parents are and can ensure that the child 
will know from whence he or she came. In other cases, for example 
adoptions from foster care or adoptions by gay male couples, the 
adoption may be open with ongoing visitation or other contact. This 
contact may be with the birth mother or the extended family. 
Still, in all of these cases, the exclusive one or two-parent family 
prevails as a legal matter. Thus, despite the physical impossibility of two 
parents of the same sex being the exclusive parents of a child, the law 
regarding adoption and much reproductive technology recognizes only 
two parents; and the law usually defines parents in those contexts around 
their relationship with each other, rather than a biological relationship 
with the child. As a result, these families may be facing cognitive 
dissonance regarding social and biological connections similar to that 
faced within adoption under the myth of rebirth. To the extent that 
homosexual families are normative in their nuclear structure, they are in 
 
 130. See Alenka Švab, New Ways of Parenting: Fatherhood and Parenthood in Lesbian 
Families, 38 REVIJA ZA SOCIOLOGIJU 43, 47 (2007) (Although lesbian parents are reflecting 
conventional notions of fatherhood, they are also ―playing a subversive role as they are redefining 
these discourses and family relations. . . [including] the separation of parenting from the dominant 
social meanings of gender and the . . . separation of mothering and fathering from the idea of 
common residency . . . [and a] shift . . . to multiple parenthood by including other social parents.‖). 
 131. See supra Sec. II.B. 
 132. See supra Sec. II.A. 
 133. See supra Secs. II.A–B. 
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danger of falling into the trap of the closed adoption model. On the other 
hand, these lesbian and gay families who are not wedded to the nuclear 
structure are finding themselves and their children in larger genetic and 
social kinship networks. Thus, although controversy surrounds same-sex 
marriage and lesbian and gay families with children, these families 
appear to be remarkably similar structurally to other post-modern 
families formed through adoption, ART, and remarriage. Many appear to 
hew both toward heteronormativity in terms of adult-affective binary and 
mutual relationships and toward post-modernity in their expansive kin 
networks and embrace of social and biological kin. 
 
A.  Lesbian and Gay Families and ART 
 
Lesbians and gays use various reproductive technologies to create 
families. Lesbians might use anonymous or known sperm donation and 
gay men might engage a surrogate. The children born from these 
arrangements have at least two parents: a legal biological parent and a 
biological parent. Thus, even for single parent families, the child has 
connections to at least one other person who is a parent at least in a 
genetic sense. In same-sex couple families who use more exotic 
reproductive technologies, children can have a slew of parents: the two 
who raise him or her, any gamete donors, and even birth parents. These 
families created through reproductive technologies represent perhaps the 
biggest departure from the family created as a result of biological 
procreation between married couples. Yet, these newest of families too 
are rooted in and have not escaped biology; they replicate 
heteronormativity through their experience of biological loss and 
connection and also in their choices of donors and of family structure. 
Sperm donation, and to a lesser extent egg donation, has traditionally 
been anonymous, particularly when health care professionals are 
involved, and anonymity remains the legal norm in this country.
134
 This 
anonymity arguably promotes donations,
135
 but also helps to deny 
biological relatedness to the donor, protect the autonomy of the intended 
family, and reinforce heteronormativity. Indeed, to further preserve the 
nuclear family ideal and mask the missing genetic ties, reproductive 
 
 134. Joanna E. Scheib & Rachel A. Cushing, Open-identity donor insemination in the United 
States: is it on the rise? 88 FERTILITY & STERILITY 231, 231–32 (2007) (noting there are only nine 
open donor insemination banks in the United States). 
 135. See Amy Harmon, Are You My Sperm Donor? Few Clinics Will Say, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 20, 
2006, at A1, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2006/01/20/.national/20donor.html (last visited 
Oct. 22, 2007) (reporting that donations have dipped in Great Britain since it outlawed anonymous 
donations); Scheib & Cushing, supra note 134, at 232 (noting concerns that sperm donations would 
dip if the law banned anonymity). 
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technology legal regimes often cut off any potential legal relationship 
between the donor and the child.
136
 This, like adoption, is a departure 
from biologically-based parenthood norms and yet recalls normative 
family forms and structures. 
Children born through gamete donation experience similar themes of 
connection and identity as adoptive children.
137
 It is not surprising then 
that as assisted reproduction becomes more common and less secretive, 
children of donor insemination are expressing interest in having 
knowledge of and even contact with their donor parents and siblings.
138
 
These children (and adults) of donor insemination want such knowledge 
and contact with the donor to learn more about themselves and complete 
their sense of identity.
139
 Parents choosing open donor insemination do 
so to provide their children the option of contacting the donor and to help 
ensure that should the child need medical or other information in the 
future, it will be accessible.
140
 
Perhaps reflecting the move toward openness in adoption, there is 
some movement toward openness in ART.
141
 This openness extends to 
telling the children about their ART origins and to openness regarding 
the identity of the donor.
142
 Although there are differences regarding 
disclosure issues in families created through ART and adoption,
143
 many 
of the same lessons of closed, anonymous adoption underlay this move 
toward more honesty regarding genetic parentage.
144
 Advances in genetic 
 
 136. See Mary Patricia Byrn, From Right to Wrong: A Critique of the 2000 Uniform 
Parentage Act, 16 UCLA WOMEN‘S L.J. 163, 169–76 (2007) (tracing these changes). 
 137. Katrina Hargreaves & Ken Daniels, Parents Dilemmas in Sharing Donor Insemination 
Conception Stories with their Children, 21 CHILD. & SOC‘Y 420 (2007); Joanna E. Scheib et al., 
Choosing Between Anonymous and Identity-Release Sperm Donors: Recipient and Donor 
Characteristics, 10 REPROD. TECH. 50, 54 (2000). 
 138. E.g., Joanna E. Scheib et al., Adolescents with Open-Identity Sperm Donors: Reports 
from 12–17 Year Olds, 20 HUM. REPROD. 239, 239–52 (2005). 
 139. E.g., id. at 248. 
 140. Scheib et al., supra note 137, at 54. 
 141. Scheib & Cushing, supra note 134. In other parts of the world, the move is clearly toward 
openness. See, e.g., Hargreaves & Daniels, supra note 137, at 421–22 (noting legal and practice 
changes in New Zealand, UK, and Australia toward making donor identities available to adults born 
through donor insemination). 
 142. Infra text accompanying notes 155–174. ―Guidelines for clinical practice now tend to 
include recommendations for openness‖ to children regarding their donor origins. Rachel Cook et 
al., Disclosure of Donor Insemination: Parental Attitudes, 65 AM. J. ORTHOPSYCHIATRY 549, 549 
(1995) (citing American Fertility Society, 1993; Human Fertilisation and Embryology Authority, 
1993); see also Scheib & Cushing, supra note 134  at 231–32 (noting openness is on the rise); 
Nanette Gartrell et al., The National Lesbian Family Study: 4. Interviews With the 10-Year-Old 
Children, 75 AM. J. ORTHOPSYCHIATRY 518 (2005) (noting that families were evenly divided 
between choosing known and unknown donors). 
 143. Cook et al., supra note 142, at 558; Ellen Waldman, What Do We Tell the Children?, 35 
CAP. U. L. REV. 517, 533–35 (2006). 
 144. See Hargreaves & Daniels, supra note 137, at 420 (discussing reasons for openness 
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science and testing have also no doubt influenced this movement toward 
openness, as DNA testing is able to identify parentage and so many other 
aspects of a person‘s life.145 
Increasingly then, parents and children in families created through 
reproductive technologies involving gamete or womb donors experience 
second, third, fourth and fifth parents who are not formally part of the 
family. For example, a gay male couple might seek a woman to donate 
an egg for them to inseminate with one or both of their sperm or the 
sperm of another donor; the egg might then be implanted into another 
woman‘s womb, producing a child with two to three fathers and two 
mothers. Yet, in other ways these families tend to hew toward the 
modern family and heteronormativity. Even those who cannot pass as a 
traditional family, such as same-sex partners, are likely to choose a donor 
with characteristics similar to the non-genetically related parent.
146
 
Lesbian couples make these choices also to increase the partner‘s 
involvement with the donor insemination process and the child they will 
share.
147
 
Judith Stacey‘s study of gay male parenting in Los Angeles revealed 
the presence both of heteronormative practices and themes and of 
blended biological and social families.
148
 For example, one Catholic 
white male couple comprised two affluent professionals raising three 
children born to the same surrogate mother.
149
 The men, Eddie and 
Charles, have joint legal custody.
150
 While they share childcare duties, 
Charles is the main breadwinner who works outside the home while 
Eddie is the primary caregiver for the children.
151
 Eddie expresses great 
satisfaction with the arrangement but fears that he ―may have committed 
career suicide by joining the mom‘s club in the neighborhood.‖152 
Despite this most traditional, nuclear family arrangement, the 
family‘s non-nuclear biological connections have produced an extended 
 
regarding donor insemination). 
 145. See Byrn, supra note 136, at 171–76 (discussing the development of genetic testing in the 
late 1960s and subsequent developments in reproductive technology). 
 146. Scheib et al., supra note 137, at 55 (noting that 61% of lesbians in the study matched the 
donor to the non-genetic parent). The authors of the study noted that ―[a]lthough 74% of our couples 
were lesbians, respondents still reported a strong preference that the donor be matched to their 
partner, suggesting that matching serves functions beyond concealing non-genetic relatedness 
between father and child.‖ Id. at 50. 
 147. Id. at 55; Caroline Jones, Looking Like a Family: Negotiating Bio-Genetic Continuity in 
British Lesbian Families Using Licensed Donor Insemination, 8 SEXUALITIES 221, 225–29 (2005). 
 148. Stacey, supra note 20. 
 149. Id. at 27. 
 150. Stacey, supra note 20. 
 151. Id. at 36. 
 152. Id. 
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kin network with much social interaction. The eggs of another woman, a 
known donor, created all three children. Charles‘s sperm fertilized the 
egg that became the daughter; and Eddie‘s sperm fertilized the egg that 
would become the twins.
153
  The same surrogate mother, Sally, carried 
these three fertilized eggs to birth. When the twins were born, both Eddie 
and Charles, the egg donor, and the Sally‘s husband attended the 
surrogate‘s birth. 154  This five-some has stayed in touch since the 
children‘s birth.155 Sally and her family have become close to Charles 
and Eddie‘s family—close to the point of vacationing together.156 The 
children of each family see each other as siblings.
157
 The egg donor is not 
as close, but she visits the children occasionally and has even joined the 
extended family on one of their vacations.
158
 Eddie, the man who fills the 
traditional maternal role, and Sally have forged ―an extraordinary, deep, 
familial bond‖ and have long, daily phone calls when they are not 
otherwise together.
159
 
Lesbian couples creating families through ART also reflect 
heteronormativity and challenge it by creating more porous family 
boundaries.
160
 Lesbian couples simultaneously tend to prefer and use 
known donors, to choose donors who reflect them or their partners, and 
to want ongoing relationships with the donors.
161
 Whether lesbians 
privilege the biological connection or the ability to have an ongoing 
social relationship with the donor may depend on the level of social 
acceptance of homosexuality.
162
 For example, lesbian parents in Sweden, 
which has laws permitting same sex civil unions and adoptions, are more 
likely to choose known, participatory donors than lesbians in Ireland, a 
country that is more socially conservative and does not provide for 
 
 153. Id. at 34–36. 
 154. Id. at 35–36. 
 155. Id. at 36. 
 156. Id. 
 157. Id. at 36. 
 158. Id. 
 159. Id. 
 160. See, e.g., Gartrell et al., supra note 142, at 518 (mothers in the study ―were equally 
divided in selecting known and unknown donors, [and] expected to discuss the insemination process 
with the children when they reached an appropriate age.‖). It is also widely believed that lesbians are 
more egalitarian and less role-bound than heterosexuals. Gillian A. Dunne, Opting into Motherhood: 
Lesbians Blurring the Boundaries and Transforming the Meaning of Parenthood and Kinship, 14 
GENDER & SEXUALITY 11 (2000). But see Julie Shapiro, A Lesbian-Centered Critique Of Second-
Parent Adoptions, 14 BERKELEY WOMEN‘S L.J. 17, (1999) (critiquing regressive effects of 
heteronormativity among lesbian parents). 
 161. Dunne, supra note 160, at 15; Scheib et al., supra note 138; Švab, supra note 130, at 47–
48. 
 162. See Švab, supra note 130, at 46–48 (comparing lesbian choices regarding donor 
involvement in Ireland and Sweden). 
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lesbian and gay partnership or co-parenting.
163
 This was true even though 
Irish lesbians valued known, involved donors and even though non-
marital fathers have much more limited rights in Ireland than they do in 
Sweden.
164
 Moreover, Swedish lesbian parents valued donors for the 
social role they might play in the child‘s life while Irish lesbian parents 
had more restrictive views of the importance of the donor—equating it 
primarily with the biological connection.
165
 
In one study of British lesbian couples raising children created 
through donor insemination, forty percent of the families had regular 
contact with the donors and less frequently the donor was co-parenting, 
including providing financial support for the child.
166
 This contact also 
made it more likely that the children would have relationships with the 
sperm donors‘ families as well.167 The couples often chose donors who 
were friends or family, and the donors took on an avuncular role and 
often were referred to as ―uncle.‖168 In a family where the father was 
more involved and saw the child every day, one of the mothers stated the 
―he has become part of the family . . . in a sense, or we‘ve become part 
of his. But we live in two separate homes.‖169 
Like Charles and Eddie, above, who took turns providing sperm to 
inseminate the children, many lesbian couples alternate childbearing.
170
 
In this way, it appears that same-sex couples create less direct 
heteronormative biological connection: instead of a man and a woman 
producing a child to whom they are both biologically related, the same-
sex couples create this connection by trading reproductive roles 
regarding the children born into the family. Taking the family as a whole, 
then, each parent is biologically related to at least one of the children and 
socially related to each of the children. It also enables each parent to 
experience biological parenthood. In addition, one of the reasons lesbians 
choose known donors and want continued relationships between them 
 
 163. Róisín Ryan-Flood, Contested Heteronormativities: Discourses of Fatherhood among 
Lesbian Parents in Sweden and Ireland, 8 SEXUALITIES 189, 191–93 (2005). 
 164. Id. at 193. 
 165. Id. (―the most dramatic difference between Irish and Swedish participants [in the study] 
was that Swedish lesbians were far more likely to choose an involved donor‖ than Irish lesbians). 
 166. Dunne, supra note 160, at 16, 27. 
 167. See id. at 24 (describing sperm donor‘s mother as a grandmother to both her son‘s child 
and the child‘s sibling, born through the sperm of another donor and to a different mother). 
 168. Id. at 18, 22. Compare with the gay male family where the surrogate mother was called 
―Mama, Sally.‖ Stacey, supra note 20, at 38. It was not uncommon for the sperm donor to be a 
friend of one of the partners, even the one who did not give birth. Dunne, supra note 160, at 17–18, 
22–24. 
 169. Dunne, supra note 160, at 26. 
 170. Id. at 21–22. They may also combine the maternal functions of egg donation and 
gestation while utilizing ART to implant one woman‘s fertilized egg into her partner‘s womb. E.g., 
K.M. v. E.G., 117 P.3d 673 (Cal. 2005). 
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and their offspring is to provide the child with male role models.
171
 
Indeed, the very ―ideology of parenting whereby children require access 
to a ‗male role model‘ father‖ 172  suggests a significant amount of 
conventionality among lesbian families who seem to be tweaking, rather 
than rejecting, heteronormativity. Other lesbian parents who do not want 
donor involvement may replicate the binary parent aspects of 
heteronormativity by rejecting the notion of three parents.
173
 
 
B.  Lesbian and Gay Adoption  
 
In addition to using ART, lesbians and gays create families while in 
heterosexual relationships and through adoption, even while openly 
acknowledging their sexual orientation.
174
 Sources estimate that fifty-two 
thousand lesbians and gay men in the United States have become legal 
parents through adoption.
175
 When lesbians and gays bring children to 
the relationship from a prior relationship, adoption law governs their 
options for establishing parental rights and responsibilities for the second 
parent. State adoption laws, however, closely reflect remarkably similar 
norms regarding families and parenting in that they model exclusive 
parenting, two-parent marital families, or single parents.
176
 Adoption 
generally does not countenance as parents persons who are not 
romantically intimate with each other, such as a gay male couple and the 
birth mother, two siblings, or a grandmother and her daughter;
177
 instead, 
most states‘ adoption laws contemplate single or married parents or 
persons who act like married couples.
178
 
Four states have statutes that specifically permit or prohibit lesbian 
and gay adoption: Florida, which prohibits lesbian and gay adoption;
179
 
 
 171. Dunne, supra note 160; Ryan-Flood, supra note 163, at 196. Studies also revealed that 
lesbians preferred gay men as involved fathers because they shared a ―common history of 
oppression‖ and lesbians perceived gay men to be more committed to the child and less likely to 
seek custody. Id. at 199–200; Catherine Donovan, Who Needs a Father? Negotiating Biological 
Fatherhood in British Lesbian Families Using Self-Insemination, 3 SEXUALITIES 149, 155 (2000). 
 172. Ryan-Flood, supra note 163, at 198. According to Fiona Tasker, one older ―study 
reported that children from lesbian mother families were more likely than children from single 
heterosexual mother families to visit their nonresident father on a regular basis.‖ Tasker, supra note 
112, at 25. 
 173. Donovan, supra note 171, at 158. 
 174. Approximately 35% of lesbians and 16% of gay men have children, for a total of 65,500 
children being raised by a lesbian or gay parent. GATES ET AL., supra note 115, at 7. 
 175. Id. at 7. That amounts to 4% of adopted children in the United States. Id. at 11. 
 176. Appell, supra note 83, at 79. 
 177. See, e.g., In re Adoption of Garrett, 841 N.Y.S.2d 731 (N.Y. Surr. Ct. 2007) (refusing to 
permit the mother‘s brother to adopt the child as a co-parent). 
 178. Appell, supra note 83, at 79. 
 179. Florida‘s ban, enacted in 1977, states: ―No person eligible to adopt under this statute may 
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Mississippi, which prohibits ―couples of the same gender‖ from 
adopting;
180
 and Connecticut and California, which provide explicit 
procedures for lesbian and gay couples to adopt.
181
 Oklahoma was a fifth 
state, but its prohibition of the recognition of same-sex couple adoptions 
from foreign jurisdictions
182
 may be null since the Tenth Circuit Federal 
Court of Appeals found that it violated the Constitution‘s Full Faith and 
Credit Clause.
183
  In addition, Utah has a ban that would preclude many 
lesbian and gays from adopting.
184
 
Other states have more traditional adoption laws that do not 
expressly refer to single or same-sex couple adoption. The biggest 
roadblock to same-sex couple adoptions may be the absence of special 
provisions for non-marital couple adoption. The heteronormativity of 
virtually all adoption statutes contemplates adoption by one person or 
two married persons and mandates that the legal parents will lose 
parental rights before an adoption can occur, except in stepparent 
adoptions.
185
 On their face, these statutes appear to require termination of 
parental rights of the legal parent seeking to have her lesbian partner 
adopt the child.
186
 Similarly, the literal language of the statutes might 
suggest that same-sex couples cannot jointly adopt an infant or foster 
child not related to either of them because the statutes provide for a 
―person‖ or ―married couple‖ to petition for adoption.187  Although a 
number of courts have read ―person‖ in the plural,188 other states courts 
have interpreted the statute to permit only one member of the couple to 
adopt, for in all states but Massachusetts (and arguably Iowa), lesbians 
 
adopt if that person is a homosexual.‖ FLA. STAT. ANN. § 63.042(3) (West 2000). 
 180. MISS. CODE ANN. § 93-17-3(5) (West 2000). 
 181. Cal. Fam. Code 9000(f) (West 2004 & Supp. 2007); Conn. Gen. Stat. 45a-724(a)(3) 
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 183. Finstuen v. Crutcher, 496 F.3d 1139 (10th Cir. 2007). 
 184. Utah Code Ann. § 78-30-1(3)(b) (Lexis 2002 & 2007 Supp.). Utah prohibits adoption ―by 
a person who is cohabiting in a relationship that is not a legally valid and binding marriage under the 
laws of this state. For purposes of this Subsection (3)(b), ‗cohabiting‘ means residing with another 
person and being involved in a sexual relationship with that person.‖ Single lesbians and gays 
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 185. Appell, supra note 83, at 79 (citing e.g., N.J. Stat. Ann. § 9.3-43 (―any person may 
institute an action for adoption . . . .‖); N.Y. Dom. Rel. Law §110 (an ―adult unmarried person or an 
adult husband and his adult wife together may adopt another person‖); Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 15A, § 1-
105 (―all parental rights of each former parent of the adoptee terminate‖ upon adoption); D.C. Code 
Ann. § 16-312(a) (―A final decree of adoption establishes the relationship of natural parent and 
natural child between adopter and adoptee for all purposes . . . .‖)). 
 186. Appell, supra note 83, at 75. 
 187. Id. at 79. 
 188. Id. at 83. 
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and gays cannot get married.
189
 
The trend appears to be in favor of permitting lesbian and gay and 
same-sex adoption.
190
 Even though the best interests of the child standard 
may provoke more scrutiny for lesbian and gay adoptions,
191
 it has more 
often than not been utilized to grant adoptions.
192
 In fact, the reported 
decisions suggest that courts confronted with lesbian and gay families 
that embody dominant marital norms of monogamy, financial security, 
mutual care and support, and psychological parenting
193
 find adoption to 
be in the child‘s best interest despite lack of clear statutory support for 
such non-marital, two-parent adoptions.
194
 
In any event, adoption law and practice appear to require lesbians 
and gay men to conform to modern heterosexual norms to adopt. For 
example, adoption agencies may deem a gay man unsuitable to adopt if 
he has a domestic partner who does not want to be an adoptive parent.
195
 
This happened with one gay man Judith Stacey studied who wanted to 
adopt a child but his live-in lover did not.
196
  The county adoption agency 
 
 189. See Goodridge v. Dep‘t of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941 (Mass. 2003); Varnum v. Brien, 
Case No. CV5965 (Aug. 30, 2007, Iowa Dist. Ct., Polk County). 
 190. Compare, e.g.,, In re K.M. & D.M., 653 N.E.2d 888 (Ill. App. 1995), and In re Infant 
Girl W., 845 N.E.2d 229 (Ind. App. 2006), and In re K.S.P., 804 N.E.2d 1253 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004), 
and In re M.M.G.C. 785 N.E.2d 267 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003), and In re Sharon S., 31 Cal. 4th 417, 73 
P.3d 554 (Cal. 2003), and In re R.B.F. & R.C.F., 803 A.2d 1195 (Pa. 2002), and In re H.N.R., 666 
A.2d 535 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1995), and In re M.M.D. & B.H.M., 662 A.2d 837 (D.C. 1995), 
and In re Jacob, 660 N.E.2d 397 (N.Y. 1995), and In re Tammy, 619 N.E.2d 315 (Mass. 1993), and 
In re Adoptions of B.L.V.B. & E.L.V.B, 628 A.2d 1271 (Vt. 1993) (all permitting same-sex couple 
adoption under traditional adoption statutes), with In re Luke, 640 N.W. 2d 374 (Neb. 2002), and In 
re Adoption of Baby Z., 724 A.2d 1035 (Conn. 1999), and Matter of Adoption of T.K.J., 931 P.2d 
488 (Colo. Ct. App. 1996), and In re Angel Lace M., 516 N.W.2d 678 (Wisc.1994) (all rejecting 
same-sex partner adoption under traditional adoption statutes). Recently, over half a dozen states 
have extended marital rights, including same-sex parent adoption, to same-sex couples. Cal. Fam. 
Code § 297.5 (West 2005); Conn. Gen. Stat. §§ 46b-38bb (West Supp. 2007); N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. 
ch. 457-A (Supp. 2007); N.J. Stat. Ann. 9:3-37 (West Supp. 2007); Oregon Family Fairness Act, 
Oregon Laws 2007, ch. 99; Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 15, § 1204 (2002); Goodridge v. Dep‘t of Pub. Health, 
798 N.E.2d 941 (Mass. 2003). As noted above, fewer states ban lesbian and gay single or couple 
adoption. 
 191. E.g., In re C.M.A., 715 N.E. 2d 674 (Ill. App. Ct. 1999) (noting that same-sex couple 
adoptions receive greater scrutiny than stepparent adoptions). In any event, it is difficult to assess 
conclusively how courts are responding to petitions lesbian and gay single and same-sex couple 
adoptions because adoption proceedings are closed, sealed and usually uncontested so they rarely 
yield published decisions. Because the proceedings themselves are sealed, research is challenging. 
 192. E.g., In re Adoption of Carolyn B., 774 N.Y.S.2d 227 (N.Y. App. Div. 2004); In re 
R.B.F. & R.C.F., 803 A.2d 1195 (Pa. 2002). 
 193. See Jane Spinak, When Did Lawyers For Children Stop Reading Goldstein, Freud And 
Solnit? Lessons From The Twentieth Century On Best Interests and The Role Of The Child 
Advocate, 41 FAM. L.Q. 393 (2007) (providing an excellent overview and assessment of the 
influential work of Goldstein, Freud and Solnit which privileged children‘s affective relationships 
with their care givers, also known as the psychological parent standard). 
 194. Appell, supra note 83. 
 195. Stacey, supra note 20, at 37. 
 196. Id. 
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required the prospective adoptive parent to terminate his relationship 
with the partner who did not want parent in order to be considered as an 
adoption resource.
197
 The agency could not fathom that one man would 
adopt and his partner would not, so it required the non-paternal half of 
the couple to participate in the adoption as a condition to permitting the 
man who wanted the children to adopt.
198
 In other words, to adopt as a 
single person, the adoption seeker would have to be single in fact, even if 
marriage was not legally available to him.
199
 In this way, the agency 
appropriated heterosexual norms that couple adult intimacy with child 
bearing and raising. 
In addition, rearing children may provide some measure of 
heterosexual privilege, acceptance, and naturalness. That was the case for 
this same adoption seeker whose partner did not want to adopt. Once he 
and his partner separated, in large part because the agency required it, the 
county allowed the adoption seeker to become licensed and eventually 
adopt.
200
 After that, he gained great currency with his family and 
especially his mother who initially did not accept her son‘s 
homosexuality.
201
 After he became a parent she came to admire him over 
all of her other children for his good parenting and treatment of her, his 
mother.
202
 
Despite their apparent tendency toward conventionality, the adoption 
fiction of rebirth is more difficult to sustain for same-sex adoptive 
families simply by virtue of the sex of the parents.
203
 Moreover, these 
lesbian and gay families, like other adoptive families and families 
created through ART, do not have complete biological connections with 
the children. There remain people outside of the legal family who have 
reciprocal biological, and sometimes affective, relationships with the 
children. Birth fathers, birth mothers, and gamete donors are often 
known in these adoptions and, like their heterosexual counterparts, 
lesbians and gays may have ongoing relationships with the known donors 
or surrogates.
204
 
It is not clear whether these relationships in the adoption context are 
as rich or enduring as the studies suggest they are in the ART cases. 
 
 197. Id. 
 198. The county would not allow him to become a pre-adoptive foster parent as long as he 
lived with an intimate partner who would not participate in the foster care licensing process. Id. 
 199. Id. 
 200. Id. at 36–37. 
 201. He reported his mother telling him that ―there‘s nothing to accept. You‘re natural, you‘re 
normal.‖ Id. at 38. 
 202. Id. 
 203. See discussion and notes supra Sec. II.2. 
 204. E.g., Thomas S. v. Robin Y., 618 N.Y.S.2d 356 (N.Y. App. Div. 1994). 
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There may be something about the legal and psychic aspects of the 
adoption process that discourages these relationships,
205
 or it simply may 
be that the case law and studies do not yet reflect these practices. At any 
rate, there is some evidence that open adoptions are occurring among 
lesbian and gay parents. For example, a gay couple who adopted a child 
in Washington agreed ―[a]s part of the adoption proceedings‖ to ―bring 
[the child] back to Oklahoma to visit her birth family.‖206 In another 
reported case, a white male gay couple who adopted an African 
American infant had an agreement with the birth mother, who lived with 
them while pregnant, for ongoing visitation after adoption.
207
 
Mostly though, the reported decisions permitting same-sex couple 
adoption reflect traditional adoptive family relationships, primarily 
lesbian second parents seeking to adopt their partners‘ biological 
children.
208
 These cases do not reveal any suggestion that the adoptive 
families had ongoing contact with the donors or birth parents. Because 
the female reproductive roles (gestation and egg donation) are more 
intense and intrusive than that of the men (sperm donation) gay male co-
parents are at more of a disadvantage in obtaining children for adoption. 
Thus, gay men may be more likely to have relationships to birth mothers 
because gay men have less access to children and are more likely to 
negotiate with birth mothers for ongoing contact after adoption.
209
 
 
IV.  LESSONS OF ADOPTION WITH CONTACT  
 
The expansive kinship networks of so many same-sex couple 
families suggest that it is not necessary to undermine or devalue biology 
as a primary basis of family to achieve protection or recognition for other 
 
 205. It may be that the very formality and publicness of the processes of terminating parental 
rights and creating new parents may require adoptive parents to project normalcy rather than messy, 
rambling extended families, in order to gain the sanction of social services and courts. 
 206. Finstuen v. Edmondson, 497 F. Supp. 2d 1295, 1301 (W.D. Okla. 2006) affirmed in part, 
reversed in part, Finstuen v. Crutcher, 496 F.3d 1139 (10th Cir. 2007). This language suggests that 
the agreement may have been made pursuant to Washington‘s adoption with contact statute, WASH. 
REV. CODE § 26.33.295 (1990). 
 207. In re M.M.D., 662 A.2d 837 (D.C. 1995). 
 208. E.g., In re K.M., 653 N.E.2d 888 (Ill. App. Ct. 1995); In re Adoption of M.A., 930 A.2d 
1088 (Me. 2007); Adoption of Tammy, 619 N.E.2d 315 (Mass. 1993); In re Jacob, 660 N.E.2d 397 
(N.Y. 1995); In re Adoption of B.L.V.B, 628 A.2d 1271 (Vt. 1993). 
 209. See Tasker, supra note 112, at 225 (―Many gay men have become fathers through co-
parenting arrangements with lesbian mothers‖ with or without sperm donation, through surrogacy 
arrangements, and adoption of foster children.). However, in most of the few reported gay male 
same-sex couple adoption cases there was no indication that there was any post-adoption contact. In 
re Hart, 806 A.2d 1179 (Del. Fam. Ct. 2001); In re Adoption of R.B.F., 803 A.2d 1195 (Pa. 2002). 
Of course, post-adoption contact was not an issue in those cases, so if there was any such contact, it 
would not necessarily have been reflected in the proceedings. 
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family formations, including adoptive families, kinship networks, and 
same-sex or plural parent families. Nor is it necessary to discard these 
new family forms in favor of modern values. More helpful may be an 
enhanced notion of biological connection—one that accounts not only 
for the social and political importance of biological connection, but also 
for the existential aspects of biological ties and the palpability of genetic 
tissue for the adults and the children. The persistence of the profound 
existential and social importance of biological connections suggests we 
are not ready to define families through the relationship between the 
adults and disregard the child‘s connections to biological parents and 
gamete donors. This does not mean that legal parents should be 
recognized solely by biological relationship to the child or that children 
should have multiple parents with full parental status. 
On the other hand, some rules may be helpful. Many of these 
blended lesbian and gay families live outside the law. As these 
relationships become more common, and lesbians and gays more visible, 
it is likely that disputes will arise regarding these satellite relationships. 
Already there are several reported decisions.
210
 One case involving a 
bicoastal extended family started out as many same-sex parent families 
do—with a lesbian couple utilizing known donors to conceive their 
children.
211
 Robin and her partner Sandra lived together with their two 
children, one born to Sandra who conceived through known donor 
insemination and the other born two years later to Robin also through 
known donor insemination.
212
 Robin‘s donor orally agreed that he would 
not seek to establish parental rights to the child.
213
 The mothers co-
parented both children and gave them each both of their last names.
214
 
The fathers did not have much involvement in the early years of the 
children‘s lives, but when the oldest child was five and started asking 
about her father, the mothers arranged for the children to have more 
interaction with the fathers.
215
 During the next six years, Robin‘s 
daughter Ry had significant contact with her father, Thomas, seeing him 
for a few days to two weeks at a stretch approximately twenty-six times; 
during that period, they appeared to develop a ―warm and amicable 
relationship‖ and exchanged correspondence in which Ry expressed her 
 
 210. LaChapelle v. Minton, 607 N.W.2d 151 (Minn. Ct. App. 2000); Thomas S. v. Robin Y., 
618 N.Y.S.2d 356 (App. Div. 1994); see also Cahn, supra note 77, at 1162  (―Repeatedly, sperm 
donors have received extensive visitation rights over the objection of the biological mother and her 
partner.‖) 
 211. Thomas S. v. Robin Y., 618 N.Y.S.2d 356 (App. Div. 1994). 
 212. Id. at 357. 
 213. Id. 
 214. Id. at 358. 
 215. Id. 
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love for her father.
216
 This amicable situation deteriorated after Robin 
and Sandra refused to allow Thomas to take Ry, then about nine-years-
old, and her older sister Cade to visit with his parents without their 
mothers.
217
 It was at this point that Thomas indicated he wanted to 
establish parental rights, a revelation that upset the delicate balance the 
family had established.
218
 When negotiations regarding the father‘s role 
and relationship to Ry languished, Thomas sought a court order for 
filiation and visitation.
219
 
So began a four-year legal battle during which the trial court 
dismissed the action on equitable estoppel grounds, refusing to grant 
legal parental status to Thomas; then the appellate court reversed on due 
process grounds.
220
 Although the appellate court did not contemplate 
removing Ry to her father from her mothers,
221
 the dispute had an all-or-
nothing character to it. Either Thomas was the father and could press for 
increasing visitation or custody
222
 or he was not and had no right to any 
relationship with the child. Neither option seems quite right because the 
primary family unit was the nuclear family of Robin and Sandra and their 
two daughters. It is one thing to have a dispute about the extent of 
visitation; it is quite another to have a third person, albeit a biological 
father, with full, legal parental status in what began as an exclusive, if 
not legally enforceable, parenting relationship among Sandra, Robin and 
their two daughters.
223
 This exclusivity becomes even more poignant 
because, should something happen to one of the mothers, the other legal 
parent (here the father) would have a legal claim to the child while the 
social mother would not. Moreover, this four-year dispute must have 
taken an emotional and financial toll on all of the parties, not least of all 
the children. 
A similar, but messier, more complex, and longer dispute arose 
involving a lesbian couple and a gay male couple.
224
 In that case, a 
lesbian couple agreed in writing that one of the women, Mitten, would 
 
 216. Id. 
 217. Id. 
 218. Id. 
 219. Id. 
 220. Id. at 358–62. 
 221. Id. at 358–59 (―Custody of the child is not now, and is unlikely ever to be, an issue 
between the parties. Rather the question is whether the rights of a biological parent are to be 
terminated.‖). 
 222. This is despite the appellate court‘s assertion that custody would not be an issue; once 
Thomas had parental status, he would have standing to seek and possibly attain custody, particularly 
against Sandra should anything happen to Robin. 
 223. Thomas S., 618 N.Y.S.2d at 358–59. 
 224. LaChapelle v. Minton, 607 N.W.2d 151 (Minn. Ct. App. 2000). 
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have a child conceived with the sperm of LaChapelle.
225
 The four signed 
two agreements that defined the family such that Mitten and her partner 
Ohanian would have full custody of the child and LaChapelle would 
have no parental rights but he and his partner would have a ―‗significant 
relationship‘ with the child.‖226 The child, L.M.K.O., was born the year 
after they signed the second agreement; subsequently, the mothers 
obtained second parent adoption, without disclosing they had used a 
known donor.
227
 Then, when L.M.K.O. was nineteen months old, her 
mothers terminated visitation with her father and his partner.
228
 In 
response, LaChapelle successfully moved to vacate the adoption and 
subsequently petitioned to establish paternity.
229
 Mitten and Ohanian 
then broke up and custody between them became an issue. Ultimately, 
the court awarded joint custody to Mitten and Ohanian, adjudicated 
LaChapelle to be the father, and ordered him to pay child support.
230
 The 
litigation regarding this dispute lasted six years and, no doubt, carried a 
huge emotional and financial price tag that most likely inured also to the 
detriment of the child. 
These cases reveal several problems that arise when family law does 
not match the lived lives of families. Families are, of course, fertile 
ground for disputes, but clarity regarding legal rights and responsibilities 
accompanied by some deviation from all-or-nothing parental status could 
help reduce these disputes and promote more stability for the children 
involved. Adoption with contact is a model of community or shared 
parenting that may have lessons for these same-sex parent families.
231
 It 
undermines the heteronormative model of two-parent, exclusive 
parenting by recognizing the multiple people who have parental or 
parent-like relationships with children. At the same time, adoption with 
contact preserves parental status and its authority, subject to any 
voluntary agreements to allow contact or visitation with others. This type 
of adoption may provide a model for same-sex couples seeking to 
maintain a relationship with gamete donors. 
 
 225. Id. at 157. 
 226. Id. 
 227. Id. 
 228. Id. 
 229. Id. 
 230. Id. at 157–58. LaChapelle withdrew his request for legal custody on the first day of trial. 
Id. at 160. 
 231. Of course, there are many other proposals for recognizing and regulating post-modern 
families. E.g., Susan Frelich Appleton, Adoption in the Age of Reproductive Technology, 2004 U. 
CHI. LEGAL FORUM 393; Melanie B. Jacobs, My Two Dads: Disaggregating Biological and Social 
Paternity, 38 ARIZ. L.J. 810 (2006); Laura T. Kessler, Community Parenting, 24 WASH. U. J.L. & 
POL‘Y 47 (2007). 
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In the dispute between Thomas and Robin, a written, enforceable 
agreement regarding visitation and Thomas‘s legal status might have 
narrowed the areas of dispute and perhaps prevented the dispute from 
ever reaching the courts. For example, had the law permitted Thomas to 
relinquish his parental rights and enter into a separate enforceable 
agreement for visitation with Ry, he would have had the right to enforce 
or perhaps modify that visitation agreement, but would not have litigated 
the other issues regarding paternity. Similarly in the Mitten and 
LaChapelle case, had Minnesota‘s adoption with contact statute been 
enacted at the time of the second parent adoption,
232
 they could have 
simultaneously terminated LaChapelle‘s parental rights, established 
Ohanian as the second legal parent, and entered into a legally enforceable 
agreement that would have established the terms of the agreement and 
provided standards for enforcement or modification.
233
 The child would 
have two legal parents, Mitten and Ohanian, who were also her social 
parents; LaChapelle‘s status would not have been litigated; and it would 
have been clear that he was not entitled to consideration for custody. The 
only issue for dispute would have been the terms of visitation, a dispute 
that probably would not have lasted six years.
234
 
While lesbians and gays seek legal regulation of and benefits for 
their adult relationships through marriage or civil unions, they might also 
look to establishing rules for the relationships they create and maintain 
with biological parents outside the nuclear family dyad. Open adoption, 
but more specifically, adoption with contact, shows that it is possible to 
have bundles of rights, statuses, and connections that honor the parent-
child and other biological and social relationships. Adoption with contact 
 
 232. Minn. Stat. Ann. § 259.58 (West 1997). 
 233. Regarding enforcement and modification, the Minnesota statute provides: 
 
An agreed order entered under this section may be enforced by filing a 
petition or motion with the family court that includes a certified copy of the 
order granting the communication, contact, or visitation, but only if the 
petition or motion is accompanied by an affidavit that the parties have 
mediated or attempted to mediate any dispute under the agreement or that the 
parties agree to a proposed modification. The prevailing party may be 
awarded reasonable attorney‘s fees and costs. The court shall not modify an 
agreed order under this section unless it finds that the modification is 
necessary to serve the best interests of the minor adoptee, and: (1) the 
modification is agreed to by the parties to the agreement; or (2) exceptional 
circumstances have arisen since the agreed order was entered that justify 
modification of the order. 
 
MINN. STAT. ANN.. § 259.58(3)(c) (West 1997). 
 234. On the other hand, Mitten would not have been entitled to child support from LaChapelle, 
but one wonders whether that is a fair exchange for the years of litigation and the corresponding 
financial and emotional costs. 
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also protects the authority of the primary legal parents who attain and 
retain the authority to make important parental decisions regarding their 
children, such as where the child will go to school, where the child will 
live, with whom the child will visit, and all of the daily mundane and 
not-so-mundane parental determinations. Even decisions regarding 
contact with the birth family are, under adoption with contact, 
voluntary—or at least they begin that way. Rejecting the myth of 
separation may help enlarge the parental figures to whom children 
relate—while still respecting some measure of family autonomy—and 
bridge the gap between exclusive parenting and the accelerating growth 
of non-traditional family systems.. 
The endurance of biological ties in society, if not in law, suggests 
that we are not so post-modern that we are ready to release these 
connections. There is, however, what appears to be an inexorable 
movement away from the older, modern values and practices of nuclear, 
heterosexual, patriarchal families as single parents, same-sex parents, 
stepparents, kin and adoptive parents are raising children.
235
 Adoption is 
a legal institution that, though not without warts and missteps, bridges 
the modern and postmodern, creating legal stability for non-biological 
parental relationships and increasingly accommodating both biological 
ties and new family forms. Adoption‘s experiment with the complete 
subversion of biological connection is coming to an end as adoptive and 
birth families see and accept their interconnectedness.  The practice of 
open adoption has moved nearly half of the states to add to their lexicon 
a form of adoption that recognizes the importance of family autonomy 
while acknowledging the endurance of biological connections. This 
adoption with contact is based on the knowledge that children‘s social 
and biological ties are important to the child and to the adults who love 
and are connected to the child, but that not all of these adults will have 
the same relationship to the child. 
The lessons adoption can share for other post-modern families—
those characterized by the absence of at least one biological parent—are 
significant.  Indeed, as lesbians and gays form families that are not fully 
biological, they are already learning similar lessons as those learned in 
traditional adoption. Adoption with contact provides a method for 
regulating biological and non-biological relationships that privileges the 
modern family form while acknowledging and protecting those 
relationships that do not fit that narrow construct. This may be a model 
 
 235. ―More children are growing up in single-parent households and in a range of blended-
family types—that is, those that include only one of the child‘s biological parents (usually the 
mother) and an adult (usually male) biologically unrelated to the child.‖ Amy L. Wax, Engines of 
Inequality: Class, Race, and Family Structure, 41 FAM. L.Q. 567, 576 (2007). 
  
289] THE ENDURANCE OF BIOLOGICAL CONNECTION 325 
of regulation for other post-modern families that seek still to have 
parental autonomy but want structure and predictability for relationships 
that are important to the child, but do not rise to full domestic status.  
Just as adoptive families are increasingly facing each other and seeking 
relationships that are balanced and respectful of the needs, rights, and 
roles of family members, lesbian and gay families comprise a rich and 
varied array of legal and extralegal relationships among birth relatives, 
legal parents, domestic partners, and the adoptee. 
